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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the complicated and often controversial discourse on prewar and wartime
Japanese history, the subject of Japanese-Jewish relations has garnered relatively little
scholarly attention. Yet during the exodus and genocide of European Jews in the 1930s
and 1940s, Japan, devoid of a significant Jewish population throughout its history,
nevertheless became a safe haven for thousands of Jewish refugees. Despite pressures
from its Gennan ally, the Japanese government did not persecute European Jewish
refugees who came to reside within the borders of its growing empire. As a result,
thousands of Jewish lives were saved. Confounding that seemingly honorable position,
however, was an antisemitic1 current that had arrived in Japan in the 1920s and only
intensified during the war years. With government officials, intellectuals, and the media
serving as conduits to the Japanese public, Jews were cast as the "metaphorical" enemy
J The term "antisemitism" was invented by Wilhelm Marr in 1873 and originally based on the assumption
of Jewish racial inferiority to the "Aryan race." Since that time, antisemitism has been redefined in a
number of ways to include ethnic, religious, and political discrimination. However, the term is often
used in a transhistorical fashion, suggesting that "hostility toward Jews is an enduring reaction of non-
Jews to some unique and unchanging real characteristics of Jews." However, this thesis suggests that
the origins of Japanese antisemitism can be traced to Western Christian interpretations of Jews, but
perhaps more specifically to influential antisemitic texts, such as The Protocols ofthe Elders ofZion,
that emerged in the early twentieth century. Japanese antisemitism cannot be neatly defined as racist,
ethnocentric, or religious by nature. Thus, it is best defined in this thesis simply as "hostility directed at
Jews." That usage does not only imply real threats of harm toward Jews, such as those carried out by
the perpetrators of the Holocaust, but also irrational conversions of "the Jews" into a symbol whose
meaning did not depend on either real characteristics of Jews or actual contact with them. This is not a
redefinition of antisemitism, as Japanese antisemitism was fundamentally grounded in twentieth century
Western stereotypes of Jews. Like other forms of racial stereotyping, antisemitism served a similar
purpose in both the West and Japan: it defmed the Self against the antithetical Other. Gavin I. Langmuir,
Toward A Definition ofAntisemitism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 311, 351-352.
2and blamed for a wide range ofdomestic and international problems. In fact, evidence
suggests that the Japanese government's benevolent treatment ofJews was partially
influenced by fears of international Jewish power grounded in antisemitic stereotypes.
Despite efforts by a select number of scholars to prove that studying Japanese-
Jewish relations in the prewar and wartime periods can shed new light on modern
Japanese history and contribute to the already complex narrative of the Holocaust, the
subject is all too often dismissed. Some scholars subscribe to the "German pressure"
argument, suggesting that Japanese antisemitism was little more than "mindless
adherence to Nazi doctrine.,,2 For others, antisemitism coalesces nicely with Japan's
well-documented wartime brutality of conquered Asian peoples and Allied prisoners of
war. Moreover, the fact that Japanese did not actually persecute Jews seems to trivialize
their antisemitism in comparison to the massive slaughter in Europe. Even those who
have contributed greatly to our understanding of the subject are often unwilling to
categorize it as anything but a bizarre "flirtation.,,3 However, despite challenges to the
validity of the subject, numerous examples attest to the importance of Japanese
antisemitism in the prewar and wartime periods. The 1942 election of Shioden
Nobutaka-one of the most outspoken Japanese antisemites in prewar and wartime
Japan-to the Japanese Diet, for example, provides an adequate starting point from which
to assess the significance of antisemitism in Japan.
2 Jolm Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986),
251.
3 Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 156.
3Shi5den Nobutaka subscribed to an antisemitism paralleling that of many Nazis,
due in large part to the considerable time he spent in Germany as a young army officer.
Shi5den attended German anti-Semitic fairs and visited the anti-Masonic museum at
Nuremberg, made contact with Nazi propagandists such as Julius Streicher, and collected
copious amounts of antisemitic information and material for translation into Japanese,
which he assured the Germans would "contribute to the enlightenment of the Japanese
about the Jewish plan for world domination.,,4 After retiring from the Japanese Army in
1930, Shi5den became the founding president of the Kokusai Seikei Gakkai (Association
for International Politics and Economy), which was sponsored by the Foreign Ministry
for the purpose of providing the Japanese government with "Jewish information." The
association printed a biennial journal called Kokusai himitsuryoku kenkyii (Studies on
International Secret Forces), which later became a monthly under the title Yudaya Kenkyii
(Jewish Studies). Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Shi5den wrote and lectured about the
Jewish peril, never softening his contempt or his vision ofthe Jewish conspiracy as an
overwhelmingly powerful international force. 5 Still, historian Ben Ami-Shillony has
challenged Shi5den's commitment to antisemitism, arguing that Shi5den, like some other
Japanese antisemites, actually sought to befriend Jews in order to exploit them for
Japanese benefit. To prove his claim, Shillony cites a 1944 article by Shi5den in the
4 Nonnan Cohn, Warrantfor Genocide, Brown Judaic Studies 23 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981),243.
5 Gerhard Krebs, "The 'Jewish Problem' in Japanese-German Relations," in E. Bruce Reynolds, ed., Japan
in the Fascist Era, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 112; David Goodman and Masanori
Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses ofa Cultural Stereotype (New York: The
Free Press, 1995), 124.
4Nippon Times:
At present, there are about 100,000 Jews in East Asia.... They can be utilized for
the construction ofthe Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Some ofthem have
already offered their cooperation and others have expressed a desire to become
Japanese subjects. Such behavior is natural and praiseworthy.6
A full reading of the text, however, reveals that Shillony's citation was erroneous,
and that Shi5den was actually chastising individuals who wished to utilize Jews:
Some people are of the opinion that those Jews in East Asia should be utilized
properly for the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.... Such tendencies
seem very natural or praiseworthy. However, we must be on the alert lest we
should be caught by their honeyed tongues. We see in Britain and America good
examples of the nations which have fallen victim to the ... greed of the Jews.,,7
Indeed, Shi5den did not waver in his contempt for Jews. In his postwar
autobiography, Shi5den continued to reference the international Jewish conspiracy and
the supposed Jewish link to communism.8 Still, the significance of Shi5den Nobutaka
does not lie in his hard-core antisemitic writings and lectures, but rather in his
overwhelming success as a candidate in the 1942 Diet election. Running on a platform
based largely on antisemitism, Shi5den polled 76,250 votes, more than any other
candidate in Japan had ever received. A number of historians have used this fact to draw
a seemingly straightforward conclusion: Japanese constituents were antisemitic. Shi5den,
6 Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 163.
7 Nippon Times, 16 June 1942,2.
8 Shiooen Nobutaka, Shi8den Nobutaka kailwroku, (Tokyo: Misuzu ShoM, 1964),278.
5too, attributed his impressive victory to antisemitism: "Differing from the other
candidates, I talked about the annihilation of the Jewish influence lurking behind the
war."9 Indeed, most candidates were lackluster reprints from the same conservative mold,
and the campaign itselfwas highly regulated. By way of illustration, the Japanese police
made three arrests, issued fifty "cautions," and suspended six rallies on the first day of
the campaign when orators spoke on subjects deemed dangerous to the
Japanese war effort. 10 In such strictly regulated campaigns, public interest tended to
wane. In that case, Shioden 's unique platform was probably a very valuable asset. Other
factors also contributed to his victory, such as his military background, support from
Reservist Association chapters and traditional rightists such as Hiranuma KIchiro and
Toyama Mitsuru, as well as his high regard among the "intellectual class."ll
Even if Shioden's popularity cannot be solely attributed to his antisemitism, his
frequent references to the Jewish conspiracy, at the very least, did not offend Japanese
voters. It is presumptuous to conclude that Japanese who supported Shioden were
antisemites, but is also simplistic to assume that antisemitism was irrelevant. Japanese
antisemitism was not based on real interactions with Jews, but on assumptions of Jewish
character borrowed from abroad that coalesced with well-established visions of the
9 Edward 1. Drea, The 1942 General Diet Election: Political Mobilization in Wartime Japan (Lawrence,
KS: University of Kansas, Center for East Asian Studies, 1979), 107.
10 Ibid. The most common offenses were speaking ill of the political council, controlled economy, or
government policy, although "speeches attacking the upper classes," "speeches creating public disunity
or discord," or "speeches using 'improper language' and causing anxiety or confusion" were also
cautioned or suspended.
11 Ibid., 106-109.
6Western "Other." Shi5den, like other Japanese antisemites, assigned Jews negative
characteristics that served to highlight, by contrast, the positive characteristics with which
Japanese identified their own nationality, morality, and humanity. At times the "Jewish
enemy" assumed the role of the antithetical Western "Other," while at other times it
became an enemy apart. In either case, it provided Japanese with a tangible focus for
their wrath against the wartime Western enemy. The purported Jewish encroachment on
the Japanese way oflife resonated with fears ofWestern imperialism that preceded the
arrival of Commodore Mathew Perry's black ships in 1853. And the Japanese vision of
an "Asia for Asians" based on racial harmony and equality was not solely rooted in
imperialist intentions, but was also the culmination of animosities against an exploitative
and often racist "West." The notion of Jewish world domination had long been a key
component ofWestern antisemitism, just as the threat ofWestern domination had
persisted in Japan since the first Japanese contact with the Western world shortly before
the Edo period (1603-1868). As the war years dragged on and the Allied advance drew
closer to the home islands, the threat of the West loomed ever larger and antisemitism, as
well as anti-Westernism, increased in intensity and fervor.
As Hannah Arendt suggests, the growth of antisemitism can hardly ever be
explained in terms ofone single cause. 12 The same holds true in the Japanese case. The
alliance with Germany can neither be solely credited for the existence of antisemitism in
Japan, nor can it be wholly dismissed. The Germans achieved some success in
transmitting antisemitism: numerous articles and translations of German works (such as
12 Hannah Arendt, The Origins o/Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 3-5.
7Mein Kampf) were published, exhibitions were held in major cities, and a number of mid-
level government officials, including Shi6den, were directly influenced by the Germans.
At times, antisemitism could be invoked by Japanese to connect with their German ally,
to unify, however superficially, against an evil, world-dominating enemy, as well as to
downplay the power ofAllied forces by suggesting that Axis defeats were the result of
Jewish treachery. Still, Japanese antisemitism cannot be understood simply as a pale
reflection ofNazi ideology. Japanese conceptions of race were based on their perceived
"purity" in contrast to the "impurity" of the outside "Other," while Nazi racism was an
amalgamation of Social Darwinism, racial anthropology, eugenics, and traditional Jew-
hating. The inherent differences of German and Japanese racial ideas, both regarding
their personal visions of racial superiority and their treatment of other races, could never
be reconciled.
Japanese interactions with "real" Jews (those who had actual contact with
Japanese) often resulted in interpretations of the Jewish "Other" that deviated from the
ideas espoused by antisemites. Since the 1920s, "real" Jews were viewed by the
government as diverse nationals rather than as representatives of a collective race. For
most Japanese government officials, persecution of "real" Jews contradicted self-serving
visions of their moral superiority and racial tolerance, notions that were fundamental to
the wartime propaganda campaign. But for other Japanese, both common citizens and
government officials, "real" Jews were objects of pity, victims of the same racist "West"
that had orchestrated the "Yellow Peril" trend of the early twentieth century. Still others
remained indifferent to the plight of Jews, or possessed only a superficial understanding
8ofwhat antisemitism was and how it might relate to "real" Jews and the Japanese war
effort. Thus, Japanese feelings towards Jews were far from uniform, suggesting that
antisemitism, despite its frequent appearance, was hardly a unifying ideology in Japan.
As previously mentioned, few scholars have addressed Japan's relationship with
Jews in the prewar and wartime periods. Ben-Ami Shillony, Marvin Tokayer, David
Kranzler were the groundbreaking researchers in the field, establishing a solid framework
for future studies, while David Goodman, Miyazawa Masanori, and Pamela Rotner
Sakamoto have offered the most significant contributions in recent years. However, each
oftheir works has considerable drawbacks, especially concerning their limited scope and
failure to properly contextualize Japanese antisemitism.
While many historians do well in providing examples of antisemitism, in the press,
among intellectuals, and in the government, they fail to compare them with Japanese anti-
Westernism. Indeed, anti-Western wartime propaganda, a subject best described in John
Dower's War Without Mercy, cannot be divorced from antisemitic propaganda. Yet each
of the aforementioned historians begin their discussions of Japanese antisemitism with
the arrival of foreign texts such as The Merchant 0/Venice and The Protocols 0/the
Elders o/Zion, ignoring any links between historical Japanese animosity toward the West
and the acceptance of antisemitism. David Kranzler claims that "the seeds of anti-
Semitism in Japan go back as far as 1877, when Shakespeare's Merchant o/Venice was
first published in the country."l3 But while Kranzler is accurate in noting the arrival of
13 David Kranzler, "Japan Before and During the Holocaust," in David Wyman, 00., The World Reacts to
the Holocaust (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996),557.
9antisemitism from abroad, this thesis suggests that "the seeds" were sown much earlier in
Japanese history, a subject addressed in greater detail in chapter four.
The approach of many works is also problematic for one attempting to understand
the nature and purpose of Japanese antisemitism, as many focus on the experiences of
Jewish refugees rather than Japanese. Marvin Tokayer was one of the first to address the
Japanese government's Jewish policy in his 1970 book, The Fugu Plan. However,
perhaps in an attempt to appeal to a popular audience interested in the experiences of
Holocaust survivors, Tokayer alternates factual chapters with fictional ones, describing
experiences of make-believe characters that are said to reflect real Jewish refugees. His
examinations of the Japanese seem of secondary importance, as his claims are based
primarily on a single set of documents from the Japanese Foreign Ministry and second-
hand oral histories.
David Kranzler also focuses his attention far more on the experiences of Jews
than on the Japanese, and he makes little mention of antisemitism. Kranzler has offered
the most significant contribution to the history of the Shanghai Jewish community, the
largest concentration of Jews under Japanese control during the war, through numerous
articles and his monumental Japanese, Nazis, & Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of
Shanghai. In his work he does recognize the existence of antisemitism in Japan, but he
argues that, considering the thousands of Jewish lives saved, Japanese policies were
ultimately pro-Jewish.
Whether intentional or not, most works are decidedly one-sided, categorizing
"Japan" as friend or foe of the Jews. In a subject as complex and horrific as the
10
Holocaust, attempts at either blanket condemnation or commendation of "nations" or
"peoples" are all too frequent among scholars, perhaps because they offer simple
solutions to a subject that continues to baffle us. One of the most well-known examples
of that tendency is the controversial book by Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler sWilling
Executioners, which posits that ordinary Germans readily carried out the Holocaust
because antisemitism was an inherent quality of German identity. In a somewhat similar
fashion, scholars addressing Japanese-Jewish relations typically portray "the Japanese" as
either wholly guilty or innocent.
David Kranzler downplays Japanese culpability by suggesting that Japanese were
somehow unaware of the consequences of their actions: "If the supposedly sophisticated
anti-Semites ofEurope and the United States believed the Jew to be the cause of
international and domestic problems, then the naIve Japanese, but a generation removed
from feudalism, were even more susceptible."i4 Ben Ami-Shillony reiterates the notion
of Japanese victimization in his The Jews and the Japanese: The Successful Outsiders,
which compares historical experiences of Jews and Japanese to seek out commonalities
and differences. In his comparisons of "Anti-Semitism and Anti-Japanism" and
"Auschwitz" and "Hiroshima," Shillony provides a victimization link between Japanese
and Jews that diminishes the significance of Japanese wartime antisemitism, which he
ultimately dismisses as "an intellectual fad."is
14 Kranzler, "Japan Before and During the Holocaust," 559.
15 Ben Ami-Shillony, The Jews and the Japanese: The Successful Outsiders (Rutland, VT: Tuttle, 1991),
164.
11
David Goodman and Miyazawa Masanori also attempt to neatly label "Japan,"
although they reject the interpretations ofKranzler and Shillony. Their work, Jews in the
Japanese Mind, traces the history of Japanese antisemitism from the nineteenth century
to the 1990s, offering unparalleled contributions to the subject (especially their
examination of the postwar Japanese turn to philosemitism as a way to "forget" wartime
antisemitism). However, their specific focus on antisemitism, coupled with their title
choice, Jews in the Japanese Mind, leads the reader to conclude that hatred is the primary
lens through which Japanese view Jews. Thus, while providing a solid and intriguing
history ofantisemitism in Japan, Goodman and Miyazawa leave almost no room for the
possibility of different Japanese interpretations of Jews.
Indeed, more extensive examination ofthe diversity of Japanese opinions of Jews
would properly contextualize these works and avoid simplistic categorization. As
Hannah Arendt argues, comprehension of history entails "the unpremeditated, attentive
facing up to, and resisting of reality-whatever it may be or might have been.,,16 Indeed,
while objectivity can never be completely achieved, we cannot hope to understand the
development, purpose, and strength of Japanese antisemitism if we fail to broaden the
scope of our investigations. One recent work by Pamela Rotner Sakamoto, Japanese
Diplomats andJewish Refugees: A World War II Dilemma, has moved closer toward that
goal by challenging those who seek to neatly label Japanese treatment of Jews.
Sakamoto examines Japanese consuls' relations with Jewish refugees in the 1930s,
16 Arendt, The Origins ofTotalitariansim, 7.
12
concluding that they were neither collectively obedient nor rebellious. Most Japanese
diplomats were pragmatic and cautious, choosing to defer to Tokyo in times of
uncertainty. Expressions of altruism, as well as blatant acts of persecution or
discrimination, were rare occurrences. In the end, those Japanese who saved Jews often
did so inadvertently, "as a haphazard response to external conditions."17
In following the lead of Sakamoto, this thesis avoids collectively labeling "Japan"
or "the Japanese people" as antisemitic or philosemitic. However, it moves beyond the
actions of Japanese consuls, examining not only Japanese encounters with Jews, but also
their imaginings of a collective, worldwide "Jewish enemy" during the prewar and
wartime periods. It argues that, from the highest government official to the average
citizen, Japanese perceptions of Jews were multifarious and, consequently, cannot be
neatly categorized. Those who attempt to categorize Japan or the Japanese seem to
ignore the possibility that Jews could be well-treated while simultaneously being
slandered. However, that notion is only inconsistent if one accepts the Western polarity
between philosemitism and antisemitism. Japanese antisemitism was not influenced by
memories of ethnic tension, and therefore could be consistent with policies designed to
take advantage of Jews and their "expertise." Treating Jews well could help the Japanese
promote their "purity" by contrasting their humanity and racial tolerance with that ofthe
West. And for many who believed in the myth of international Jewish power, befriending
Jews likely seemed a logical way to assist in the creation of a new order in Asia. At the
17 Pamela Rotner Sakamoto, Japanese Diplomats and Jewish Refugees: A World War II Dilemma (Westport,
CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 7.
13
same time, the Jewish conspiracy had many parallels with longstanding Japanese
perceptions of the Western enemy, and it offered a simple explanation for Western
mistreatment of Japan. While not all Japanese subscribed to antisemitism, its frequent
invocation was tolerated because it did not contradict the goals of the Japanese regime.
In fact, positive and negative interpretations of Jews coexisted without inspiring intense
debate among the Japanese because both either served the war effort in some fashion or,
at the very least, did not inspire dissent among the populace.
As sociologist Maurice Freedman has suggested, one of the benefits of studying
minority groups is "the light they throw on the societies of which they are a part.,,18
Indeed, despite the invisibility of Jews as a conspicuous social force in Japan, Japan's
relations with both real and imagined Jews in the prewar and wartime periods explain
much about its tenuous relationship with the West in modem history. With that focus in
mind, this thesis re-contextualizes the subject ofJapanese antisemitism. While it
provides a narrative of Japanese-Jewish relations in the prewar and wartime periods that
includes a discussion of the rise of antisemitism and government reactions to Jewish
refugees, this thesis will also examine the variety ofpublic and private Japanese
responses to Jews, as well as the influence of German pressure, concluding that Japanese
antisemitism was neither all-encompassing nor completely adopted from abroad. From
that point, the thesis examines the historical role ofthe "Other" and "the West" in Japan,
placing antisemitism within that broader framework. After exploring the functions of
antisemitism in prewar and wartime Japan and its relation to anti-Westernism, the study
18 Maurice Freedman, "Jews, Chinese, and Some Others," British Journal ofSociology 10, no. 1 (1959): 61.
concludes with an analysis of the problems associated with contemporary Japanese
memories ofJews and the Holocaust.
14
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CHAPTER II
JAPANESE-JEWISH RELATIONS THROUGH 1945
AND THE RISE OF ANTISEMITISM
Historically, Japanese and Jews have had little direct contact. Historian Herman
Dicker claims that Jewish traders appeared in Japan as early as the ninth century.
However, it was not until the arrival of Commodore Perry's black ships and the "opening"
of Japanese ports that Jews began to arrive in greater numbers. Usually working as
merchants, they settled in cities such as Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki, and by the tum
of the century had established small yet vibrant communities. The Jewish population in
Japan grew slowly (less than 1,000 by the onset of World War I), so Jews remained an
obscure and largely unknown component of the population. It was during the
modernization and westernization of the Meiji Period that antisemitism first arrived in
Japan. As increasing numbers of Japanese adopted Christianity, Western missionaries
provided them with a variety of Jewish images, including the notion of Jews as "Christ
killers.,,19 However, the translation and publication of antisemitic books likely had a
greater impact on Japanese perceptions of Jews. William Shakespeare's The Merchant of
Venice, retold under the title ofJinniku shichi-ire saiban (The Mysterious Western
Human Flesh-Pawn Trial), was serialized in the Osaka Asahi Shimbun in 1885, and Ivan
19 Hennan Dicker, Wanderers and Settlers in the Far East: A Century ofJewish Li./e in China and Japan
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1962),162; Kranzler, "Japan Before and During the Holocaust," 554,
557; Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 38-39.
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Turgenev's short story, "Zhid," appeared in 1898 in the journal Kokumin no tomo. While
these works helped spread negative Jewish stereotypes through the scheming, unsavory
characters of Shylock and Zhid, it was only after Japan's involvement in the Siberian
Intervention (1918-1922) that antisemitism began to gain strength.20
Following the outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1917, America, France, Canada,
Great Britain, Czechoslovakia and Japan stationed military forces in Siberia to support
White Russian forces against the Red Army. Motivated by anti-Communism and its own
imperialist intentions, Japan committed more troops than any other nation and remained
in Siberia until 1922, two years longer than any of its allies. It was during that time that
low-level officers in the Japanese military became familiar with The Protocols ofthe
Elders ofZion, one ofthe most influential antisemitic texts ever written. The book,
which was required reading for White Russian troops, explained the Bolshevik revolution
in terms of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy. Among other things, The Protocols told of a
secret Jewish plot to destroy the world economy in order to supplant Christian
civilization with an all-powerful Zionist empire?1 Although the work was later found to
be fictitious, its portrayal of Jews as powerful international, political, and financial
figures profoundly influenced the thinking of the Japanese officers (as it did with many
others around the world). The Protocols were published in Japan in 1924 under the title
20 Avraham Altman, "Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style," in Roman Malek, ed., From Kaifeng . .. to
Shanghai: Jews in China (Nettetal, Germany: Steyler Verlag, 2000), 286; Miyazawa Masanori,
"Japanese Anti-Semitism in the Thirties," Midstream (March 1987): 23.
21 Sergei Nilns, The Protocols and World Revolution, including a Translation andAnalysis ofthe
"Protocols ofthe Meetings ofthe Zionist Men ofWisdom, " (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company,
1920),11.
17
ofSekai kakumei no rimen (Behind the World Revolution). However, some Japanese
were referencing the text even before it was translated. In 1921, Mori Kenkichi, a
member of the Information Bureau ofthe Foreign Ministry, completed Yudayajin ni
kansuru kenkyuu (A Study about the Jews), a text which made frequent use of The
Protocols in its descriptions of Jews as controllers ofworld finances, industry, and
education systems. As a result ofMori's work and the publication of The Protocols,
Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya instructed his diplomats abroad to conduct research on
Jews and report their findings. Soon after, in journals with titles such as Kokusai
Himitsu-Ryoku no Kenkyu (Studies in the International Conspiracy) and Yudaya-jin no
inbo to heinichi mondai (The Jewish plot and the Anti-Japanese problem), Japanese
began to offer their own contributions to the discourse on the "international Jewish
conspiracy. ,,22
Although antisemitism gained more recognition in Japan by the 1920s, especially
among government officials, most Japanese remained unconcerned with Jewish affairs.
However, there were significant instances in which prominent Jews became the subjects
of Japanese public attention. With the media serving as a conduit, a positive
interpretation ofJewish wealth, power, and intelligence was passed on to the Japanese
public in direct contrast to the writings of Japanese antisemites. Still, those Jews who
caught the attention ofthe Japanese were often discussed in terms of their nationality or
accomplishments, seldom in terms oftheir religion.
22 Krebs, "The 'Jewish Problem' in Japanese-Gennan Relations, 1933-1945," 108-109.
18
In the early twentieth century, the most prominent Jew from the Japanese
perspective was Jacob Schiff, a New York banker and philanthropist who chaired the firm
Kuhn, Loeb, & Co. and in that capacity played a vital role in Japan's victory in the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). During the war, the Japanese government, in desperate
need of funds, dispatched Takahashi Korekiyo to America on a special mission to
negotiate war loans. Unable to acquire assistance from banks in New York, Takahashi
proceeded to London, where he met Schiff by chance at a dinner party. Schiff helped
Takahashi secure substantial loans for the Japanese government, and he raised hundreds
of millions of dollars for the Japanese war effort. He was motivated by the potential
financial gains such loans would bring, but also by a deep resentment for the Tsar's
mistreatment ofRussian Jews. SchifPs actions were widely believed to have helped tip
the scales of the war, and following Japan's victory in 1905, he became a national hero.
During a visit to Japan in 1907, he became the first foreigner to receive the Order of the
Rising Sun from the emperor.23 Schiffdeveloped a deep respect for the Japanese,
concluding that they were a people of "great intelligence, industry, and modesty.,,24 As
the primary manager of the Japanese government's American accounts following the
Russo-Japanese War, Schiff maintained a close relationship with the Japanese. He
became friends with Takahashi and looked after his daughter, Wakiko, when she spent
23 Kase Hideaki, "Nihon no naka no yudayajin" [Jews in Japan], Chilo koron (May 1971): 244; Zvia
Bowman, "Unwilling Collaborators: The Jewish Community of Harbin Under the Japanese Occupation
1931-1945," in Malek, ed., From Kaifeng. .. to Shanghai, 323; Sakamoto, Japanese Diplomats and
Jewish Refugees, 17.
24 Cyrus Adler, Jacob H. &hiff: His Life and Letters (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc.,
1928),236.
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three years studying in America. Although Schiff criticized Japanese attempts to
establish friendly relations with Russia in the years before World War I, he later
supported Japanese expansion in Manchuria, which he believed would stabilize China
and benefit his business interests there.25
Following World War I, Japanese media attention shifted to Albert Einstein, who
had achieved international fame by the beginning of the 1920s. After receiving the Nobel
Prize in Physics in 1921, Einstein began a world tour that included a two month stay in
Japan. In late 1922, he arrived in Kobe amid much fanfare and grandiloquent praise from
the press: ("Sparkles Like Brilliant Ray! Doctor E. Giant of Scholarship").26 Einstein
lectured to large crowds in every major Japanese city. When his initial speeches (which
included Japanese translations) lasted more than four hours, Einstein took pity on his
attentive and patient audience by substantially reducing the length of his lectures.
Einstein was surprised when he was notified by two Japanese companions that those
attending the shorter lectures felt slighted. In fact, it seemed that just being in the
presence ofEinstein outweighed the content of his lectures, and many Japanese were
eager to get the chance to see him. On a number ofunscheduled occasions, Einstein was
compelled to debark from his train to greet the massive crowds gathered along the tracks.
Treated as a state visitor, he was received on separate occasions by both the Prime
Minister and Emperor. At the end of his trip, in a farewell letter printed in the Osaka
25 Dicker, Wanderers and Settlers, 164-165; Naomi W Cohen, Jacob H Schiff: A Study in American Jewish
Leadership (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 1999),34-35.
26 Marius Jansen, "Einstein in Japan," Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 152-154.
20
Mainichi, Einstein expressed his appreciation, claiming he had never experienced a more
sincere welcome then he had in Japan. 27
Although encounters with prominent individuals such as Einstein and Schiff may
have helped fashion an image of Jews in the minds ofmany Japanese, it is likely that
their Jewishness did not significantly impact their popularity. During the Taish6 Period
(1912-1926)--a time when internationalism and democratization were replacing the
Meiji goals of nation-building-it is not surprising that Schiff and Einstein were lauded
by the Japanese. Their Western identity, coupled with their financial and intellectual
prominence, enabled them to achieve iconic status. That their Jewishness did not
undermine their fame becomes more significant when viewed within the context of
increasing German antisemitism. In May 1922, Walther Rathenau, a prominent German
Jew, was assassinated by right-wing extremists in Berlin. A few months later, shortly
before deciding to travel to Japan, Einstein canceled a speaking engagement in Germany
when rumors ofpossible assassination surfaced. Japanese antisemitism was far less
fervent than in other nations, and it remained a relatively obscure ideology during the
Taish6 Period. Nevertheless, as domestic and international turmoil increased in the late
1920s, blaming Jews and the "international Jewish conspiracy" became increasingly
common.
By the late 1920s, the Japanese government was divided into two distinct factions
27 Kranzler, "Japan Before and During the Holocaust," 557; Phillip Frank, Einstein: His Lift and Times
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947), 198-199; Ronald W Clark, Einstein: The Lift and Times: An
IllustratedBiography (New York: Hany N. Abrams, Inc., 1984), 199; Jansen, "Einstein in Japan," 152-
154.
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("Control" and "Imperial Way"), each ofwhich sought to increase Japan's imperialist
presence in Asia. While the Control faction suggested a southern course into the oil-rich
Dutch East Indies, the Imperial Way faction advocated expansion into Manchuria, an area
also rich in oil but far removed from American interests in the south. By the end of the
1920s, the Imperial Way faction gained the upper hand, and the Japanese focus shifted to
the acquisition ofManchuria and preparation for future clashes with the Soviet Union.
Following the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, officials within
the Imperial Way considered various possibilities for developing the region. Veterans of
the Siberian Intervention, themselves members ofthe Imperial Way faction, suggested the
possibility ofusing Jews. At that time, several thousand Jews, mostly Russian, were
scattered throughout Manchuria, with the most sizable population residing in Harbin. Of
the city's one million residents, Jews represented only a tiny fraction. Their numbers
were as high as 13,000 in the 1920s, but by the mid-1930s more than half had left in
response to economic depression. After the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan
in 1935 and outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, thousands more left Manchukuo
(often bound for the international community in Shanghai), resulting in the complete
disappearance ofmany Manchurian Jewish communities. 28 Despite the mass exodus,
Japan's "Jewish experts," as the most influential antisemites came to be known,
established "Jewish research groups" and began to develop concrete plans to enlist Jews,
both in Asia and elsewhere, in the development ofManchukuo.
The most prominent of the "Jewish experts" in terms of their influence on the
28 Altma:n, "Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style," 315-316.
22
Japanese government were Colonel Yasue Norihiro and Navy Captain Inuzuka Koreshige.
Yasue, a relatively unimportant figure in the military before the 1930s, began writing and
lecturing about Jews shortly after his return from Siberia. In 1927, he was sent abroad by
the General Staff to study Jews for several months. After visiting Palestine, Paris,
London, and Moscow, Yasue returned home a self-styled "Jewish expert." Although
impressed with Jewish determination, Yasue was greatly influenced by The Protocols (he
claimed to be the first to translate them into Japanese). In his 1934 book, Yudaya no
hitobito (The Jews), Yasue "exposed" the Jewish control over capitalist and communist
countries. The book contained forewords by General Minami Jiro, former Army Minister
and later commander of the Kwantung Army, and General Suzuki Soroku, former chiefof
the General Staff By the late 1930s, Yasue was considered the army's highest authority
on Jews, and in 1938, he became chief of the Intelligence Bureau in Dairen.29
Like Yasue, Inuzuka returned from Siberia committed to exposing the threat of
international Jewry through research, writing, and lecturing. He frequently spoke on the
"The Jewish Menace" to younger navy officers and published his research, some of
which was labeled "top-secret" for dramatic effect, in a series called Yudayajoho (Jewish
Information). In 1938, he lectured on the dangers ofFreemasonry at the Cabinet
Intelligence Division's Ideological Warfare Seminar, and one of his speeches was
transcribed by the Tokyo Chamber ofCommerce and distributed to Chambers throughout
the country. With the publication of his book, Yudaya mondai to Nippon (The Jewish
29 Alt:man, "Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style," 300, 301, 302; Krebs, "The 'Jewish Problem' in
Japanese-Gennan Relations, 1933-1945," 109.
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Problem and Japan) in 1939 (in which he, too, "exposed" the Jewish conspiracy against
Japan), Inuzuka established a solid reputation as a "Jewish expert" and was subsequently
appointed head of the Navy's Advisory Bureau on Jewish Affairs.
Aside from the publications ofthe "Jewish experts," antisemitism was commonly
invoked by the Japanese press. In fact, Jews were mentioned or featured in a multitude of
articles from all major newspapers, as well as in drawings and manga caricatures, radio
programs, and theater performances. As domestic and international conditions
deteriorated in the 1930s and 1940s, antisemitic attacks became especially vehement and
outlandish. Jews were blamed for a variety of problems and were at the center of
numerous conspiracy theories. 3D When Jews appeared as drawings in Japanese
newspapers and magazines, they often took on clownish features, with hooked noses and
large ears. Comedy groups even parodied Jews in their performances, using them as
comical representations of the Western enemy. 31 All the while, the"Jewish experts"
wrote, lectured, and even organized antisemitic exhibitions, at times with Nazi support.
Despite the fear ofJews inspired by the media and the "Jewish experts," Yasue
and Inuzuka did not personally hope for the immediate and complete destruction of
international Jewry. Instead they adopted more pragmatic approaches for dealing with
the "Jewish problem." In Yudaya no hitobito, Yasue drew attention to the threat of Jews,
30 Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 162; Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese
Mind,108.
31 Barak Kushner, The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda, (Honolulu: University ofHawaii
Press, 2006), 109-110.
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but ultimately concluded that "some Jews were harmless, and some could be exploited."32
Similarly, Inuzuka observed that European Jews, who had been persecuted for thousands
of years, were steadily migrating east toward Japan (their "ancestral homeland,"
according to Inuzuka).33 Those Jews, Inuzuka argued, could serve a useful purpose.
With Yasue, Inuzuka concocted a plan in which the Japanese government would feign
friendship in order to exploit Jewish wealth, financial and business expertise, and
international power. By attracting Jewish settlers to a new homeland in Manchukuo, they
argued, economic and industrial development of the region would be assured. Moreover,
Jewish friendship would be vital for manipulating foreign governments (especially "Jew-
controlled America") and stemming the tide ofanti-Japanese sentiment in the
international community (a product of the "Jew-controlled press"). This scheme has been
dubbed the "Fugu Plan" by historians, based on Inuzuka's claim that exploitation ofJews
was comparable to cooking the JapanesejUgu, or pufferfish. Thefugu contains lethal
amounts of poison in its internal organs, and must therefore be carefully prepared.
Although considered a delicacy, improperly handling thefugu can spread poison to the
meat, seriously sickening or even killing those who consume the fish. In a similar way,
Inuzuka argued, one must be cautious when dealing with Jews. Iftheir power could be
properly utilized, however, Japan would reap great benefits.34
32 Yasue Norihiro, Yudaya no hitobito, (Tokyo: Gunjin Kaikan Shuppanbu, 1937), 161-162.
33 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 131.
34 Kase, "Nihon no naka no yudayajin," 242; Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz, The Fugu Plan: The
Untold Story ofthe Japanese and the Jews During World War II (New York: Paddington Press, 1979),
65.
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Indeed, the situation in Europe offered a perfect opportunity for Inuzuka and
Yasue to implement their plan. The antisemitism ofHitler and his Nazi regime resulted
in a series of decrees that stripped German Jews of their rights. In addition to increasing
taxes and freezing Jewish bank accounts, the German state sanctioned acts ofviolence
against Jews and their property. Following the Kristallnacht pogrom in November
1938-in which thousands of Jewish businesses and properties were attacked and
thousands of Jewish men were arrested and deported to concentration camps-Jews fled
Germany by the thousands. Many refugees traveled east via ship or the Trans-Siberian
Railway, although few imagined settling in China or Japan permanently. Rather, they
hoped to use Japanese and Chinese ports as departure points to overseas locations, such
as America or Palestine.
As Jewish refugees began to arrive in greater numbers, the Japanese government
worked to devise a clear-cut Jewish immigration plan. At the Five Ministers Conference
in 1938, high level government officials, including Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro,
Army Ministry Itagaki Seishir5, and Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa, adopted a policy
declaring that Jews entering and residing in Japan, China, and Manchukuo would be
treated the same as other foreigners. If Jews possessed adequate funds and obtained visas
to destination countries through appropriate legal procedures, they would be allowed to
enter Japan. It was also decided that, while efforts should not be made to attract Jews,
exceptions could be made for those Jews who could benefit Japan, such as businessmen
-------------- -----
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or technicians. 35 Thus, the Japanese government followed the Fugu Plan's preference for
exploitation rather than alienation.
By the late 1930s, Yasue and Inuzuka began to approach Jews under the guise of
friendship. The Jewish leader in Harbin, Abraham Kaufinan, was invited to Tokyo and
given an imperial award, and Kotsuji Setsuzo, "the only Hebrew-speaking Japanese in the
world," was enlisted by the Southern Manchurian Railway to develop friendly relations
with Jews in Manchukuo.36 In Harbin, Yasue helped calm the violent antisemitism of
White Russians, who were known to attack, kidnap, or murder Russian Jews. He also
closed the offices ofNash Put (Our Way), the local antisemitic newspaper, although
Jewish newspapers were apparently given more liberal guidelines to follow. In one
instance, Japanese officials in Harbin ignored a formal complaint by a German consul
who was deeply insulted by a Russian-Jewish newspaper article's attack on Hitler. It was
better not to anger the Jews, the Japanese decided, since "limiting the Jews' freedom of
speech would provoke hostility here and throughout the world of the Jews, who exercise
economic hegemony.,,37 Later, when the Police Chief ofHarbin made defamatory
statements about Jews, Japanese officials hurriedly released an apologetic statement,
claiming that "Japan and Manchuria have no reason to oppress the Jewish people, who
will have the protection of the state so long as they behave according to the regulations of
35 Sakamoto, Japanese Diplomats and Jewish Refugees, 4.
36 Tokayer and Swartz, The Fugu Plan, 66.
37 Altman, "Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style," 292-293.
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Manchuria.,,38 In fact, Russian Jews in Manchukuo were given legal status and
protection, and a Far Eastern Jewish Council was created to represent all Jews under
Japanese control, with Yasue serving as the liaison between the Japanese authorities and
the Jews. In addition, Far Eastern Jewish Conferences were held in 1937, 1938, and 1939
with the intention of expressing Japanese friendship and a desire to work with Jews to
create an "Israel in Asia." Those conferences attracted thousands of Jewish delegates
from several different communities, as well as press from Russia and Japan. General
Higuchi Kiichiro, Chief of Special Service (Intelligence) and conference attendee,
claimed that the Japanese, "look with friendship toward the Jewish people and are ready
to cooperate with [them] ....,,39
In reality, the Far Eastern Jewish Council and Far Eastern Jewish Conferences
were facades used to win Jewish favor and test the reactions of the international
community. Statements made by both Japanese and Jews were regulated and sanitized to
that effect. Yasue warned Jewish delegates not to criticize German and Italian repression
of Jews and pressured them to issue a statement describing the "racial equality and racial
justice" they enjoyed as Japanese imperial subjects, as well as their willingness to
cooperate with "Japan and Manchukuo in building a new order in Asia.,,4o Other Russian
Jews were persuaded to contact their American brethren and inform them oftheir good
38 Dicker, Wanderers and Settlers in the Far East, 37, 39.
39 Bowman, "Unwilling Collaborators," 325; Altman, "Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style," 281.
40 Altman, "ContrOlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style," 299; Bowman, "Unwilling Collaborators," 325;
Kranzler, "Japan Before and During the Holocaust," 563.
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treatment. Soon after, Inuzuka sent a confidant to America to gauge reactions. 41
It is difficult to determine the motivations of Jewish leaders in adhering to
Japanese demands, although it is likely that they had little choice. Expressions of support
may have been a small price to pay for security and the ability to carry on their lives in
peace. Still, some of the most influential Jews in Manchukuo seemed oblivious to
Japanese motives and accepted the extension of friendship without question. Abraham
Kaufman was outspoken in his support for the Japanese treatment of Jews in Manchukuo.
In a speech at the 1937 conference he stressed similarities between Jewish and Japanese
ideals, and he called on Jews to repay Japanese kindness with loyalty. Lev Zikman, one
of the most prominent Jewish entrepreneurs in Manchukuo, reiterated Kaufman's praise
for Japanese rule. Zikman defended the Japanese to skeptical American Jewish leaders,
such as Stephen Wise, in hopes of mending American-Japanese relations. He even
offered to establish a pro-Japanese Jewish newspaper. Although that dream did not
materialize, the Russian Jewish press in Harbin praised Japan, and articles appeared
defending Japan's war in China.42
By the time of the first Far Eastern Jewish Conference, the Japanese government's
lax immigration policies, coupled with its failure to acknowledge the unwillingness of
Western nations to accommodate Jewish refugees, had allowed thousands of refugees to
enter Japan or its territories with no where else to go. Initially, a number of Jewish
refugees used Kobe as a stopover point, intending to stay no more than a few weeks
41 Tokayer and Swartz, The Fugu Plan, 87.
42 Altman, "Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style," 306-310, 317.
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before immigrating westward. At that time, Kobe had the largest population of Jews in
Japan (approximately fifteen Ashkenazi and ten Sephardic families) and was home to the
political organization, "The Kobe Jewish Community" (more commonly known by its
cable address, Kobe Jewcom). As opportunities to immigrate beyond East Asia
diminished, Kobe Jewcom provided substantial assistance and "negotiated" with the
Japanese government to extend the refugees' stays for up to six months.43 By the onset of
war with America, 4,600 Jews had stayed in Japan, surviving in large part through the
help ofKobe Jewcom. Those who were unable to obtain visas to other countries by the
end of 1941 (approximately 1,000) were relocated to the Jewish community at
Shanghai. 44
Even before the forced relocations by the Japanese, Shanghai, a city offour
million Chinese and nearly 100,000 foreigners, was the most common destination for
Jewish refugees in East Asia. This was partially due to Shanghai's large International
Settlement and sizable Jewish population. More importantly, however, were the lax
restrictions for entering the International Settlement. In fact, no visa or papers of any
kind were required.45 During the six months following the Five Minister's Conference, as
many as fifteen thousand refugees were admitted to the Japanese sector in Shanghai. The
mass influx further exacerbated resources, however, and members of the International
43 Dicker, Wanderers and Settlers, 171.
44 David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis, and Jews: The Jewish RefUgee Community ofShanghai, 1938-1945
(New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1976), 314. Sakamoto, Japanese Diplomats andJewish Refugees,
93-94.
45 Kranzler, "Japan Before and During the Holocaust," 564.
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Settlement, including Jews, called for an immigration ban. In August 1939, the Japanese
authorities agreed and officially halted immigration to Shanghai. 46
In Shanghai, Jews established two separate communities of Sephardim and
Ashkenazim. Community associations oversaw religious activities, services, kosher
slaughtering, and served as arbitrators in disputes. Three daily newspapers were founded,
as well as elementary schools, medical clinics, and even a business college. There were
also recreational opportunities in the form of concerts, art exhibitions, radio programs,
theater, and sporting events. Nevertheless, life in Shanghai was not as idyllic as it
appeared. Housing was scarce and of poor quality, and the lack of food left most
refugees completely dependent on international Jewish relief organizations. 47
Following Pearl Harbor, Jews in Shanghai who had not secured visas to other
countries were barred from leaving the city. Restrictions were tightened, and relief from
Jewish organizations, which were primarily based in America, was severed. In May 1943,
a Jewish ghetto was established and refugees were relocated to a forty-square block area
that already housed more than one hundred thousand Chinese. Although the
ghettoization process resembled Nazi consolidations ofEuropean Jews in preparation for
deportation and execution, only a limited number of Jews perished in Shanghai. In fact,
most Jews fared as well, if not better, than other Shanghai residents. The ghetto remained
open, free ofbarbed wire, and refugees could acquire passes to leave the Jewish zone.
46 Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis, andJews, 21, 267; David Kranzler, "Shanghai Refuge: The Jewish Refugee
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Starvation claimed the lives of some refugees, and many reported being randomly
harassed or beaten by Japanese guards or members of the Kempeitai. However, there
were no summary executions of Jews in Shanghai, and between 1939 and 1945, there
were only thirteen deaths per one thousand persons. In fact, the deadliest day for the
Shanghai Jews was July 17, 1945, when an American bomber unintentionally dropped its
payload on the ghetto, killing thirty-one refugees and wounding two-hundred fifty others.
Despite those losses, the Jews of Shanghai lived in relative peace throughout the war
while many oftheir European counterparts faced extermination. In the end,
approximately 24,000 Jews escaped the Holocaust either by immigrating through Japan
or living under direct Japanese rule.48
The outbreak ofwar with America dashed the hopes of Inuzuka and Yasue: the
"expertise" and "wealth" of Jewish settlers could no longer be exploited to develop
Manchukuo. Moreover, the "Jewish experts" failed to impress American Jewry with their
show ofgoodwill. Still, notions of Jewish power persisted throughout the war. In late
1945, Japanese officials in Shanghai, believing that American Jewry controlled the
Roosevelt administration, insisted that Jewish leaders use their "international connections
and power" to broadcast an appeal to their American brothers to end the war. Those
attempts (not surprisingly) were unsuccessful, but they reveal that the myth ofJewish
power was never fully extinguished. 49
48 Kranzler, "Japan Before and During the Holocaust," 566; Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis, andJews, 553. The
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As previously mentioned, antisemitism was not confined to the "Jewish experts"
in the Japanese government, but was manifested in a variety of forms and dispersed
throughout the nation. Antisemitism served a useful propaganda function in wartime
Japan (a subject addressed more specifically in chapter four): in newspapers, books, and
exhibitions, Jews became "metaphorical" enemies, most often representing the unsavory
character of the antithetical Western "Other" in contrast to the pure spirit ofthe Japanese.
Given these facts, one might assume that Jew-hating garnered widespread approval in the
1930s and 1940s. However, Japanese feelings towards Jews were complex and far from
universal. Some rejected antisemitism outright, while others viewed Jews as individual
nationals rather than as a collective race. Feelings of sympathy for the "wandering Jew,"
a victim ofWestern persecution, resonated with many Japanese who knew the sting of
Western racism. The following chapter explores the variety ofways Japanese envisioned
Jews, prompting new questions about the strength and purpose of Japanese antisemitism
in prewar and wartime Japan.
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CHAPTER III
JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF JEWS BEYOND ANTISEMITISM
I am the man responsible for the alliance with Hitler, but nowhere have I promised
that we would carry out his antisemitic policies in Japan. This is not simply my
personal opinion, it is the position of Japan, and I have no compunction about
announcing it to the world.50
This statement, made by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Y6suke at a private banquet
in December 1940, seems to clearly define the Japanese government's pragmatic
approach toward Jews during the 1930s and 1940s. Given the fact that Jews were
generally well-treated by the Japanese, some historians view Matsuoka's statement as
official proofthat antisemitism was unacceptable to the Japanese and could not coincide
with the goals of the government and, ultimately, the war effort. To a certain degree, this
assessment is accurate. Although it is likely that antisemitic views were shared by at least
some high government officials, mistreatment of Jews had the potential to backfire,
providing the West with a convenient propaganda weapon at a time when the world was
closely watching. And for those officials who believed that Jews controlled international
news agencies, as many antisemites claimed, fears were likely even greater. Thus, even
though the Fugu Plan ultimately failed, a pragmatic Jewish policy was adhered to
throughout the war.
50 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 112.
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For some historians, Matsuoka's statement serves as a clear definition of "Japan's
basic position regarding Jews.,,51 But did Matsuoka really speak for "the position of
Japan?" In fact, Matsuoka's frequently cited statement was actually made to Lev Zikman
during a private meeting at the Foreign Minister's residence in Tokyo. As previously
mentioned, Zikman was a prominent businessman in Manchukuo and a strong supporter
of the Japanese. At the time of the meeting, he had been enlisted as a propagandist by
Matsuoka and charged with swaying the opinion ofAmerican Jews in favor of the
Japanese. Zikman later recalled his encounter with Matsuoka: "I asked him whether he
wanted me to tell his gracious words to my coreligionists in Manchuria or abroad, and he
said; Yes, you can, of course you can.,,52 Thus, Matsuoka's denunciation ofantisemitism
was propaganda, passed along to Zikman at a time when the government hoped to attract
Jewish friendship and wealth. For the Foreign Minister, the welfare of Jews was far
subordinate to the goals of the Japanese empire. Exactly one month after his meeting
with Zikman, Matsuoka wired the Japanese embassy in Washington, requesting that a
survey be made ofAmerican groups who opposed entering the war against Germany.
Matsuoka hoped to assess the usefulness ofthese groups as intelligence operatives and
their potential to help prevent America from going to war. Among those he was willing
to work with were communists, labor union members, African Americans, and anti-
51 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 112; Kranzler, "Japan Before and During the
Holocaust," 546.
52 Kranzler, Japanse, Nazis. andJews, 332.
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Semites. 53
In reality, Matsuoka's statement offers little help in fleshing out "the position of
Japan" in relation to Jews. In order to understand why Japanese antisemitism did not
result in widespread persecution, one must go beyond the statements ofgovernment
officials and examine the ways in which Jews were viewed in Japanese society during the
1930s and 1940s. In reality, conceptions were multifarious, and Japanese understanding
was complicated by the differences between "real" Jews and the "metaphorical" Jewish
enemy. Although much ofthe contemporary writing concerning Japanese-Jewish
relations seeks to brand "Japan" as "antisemitic" or "philosemitic," neither label suffices,
as no unitary Japanese position existed. This chapter examines the visions of Jews that
existed beneath the surface ofJapan's antisemitic current, suggesting that, despite its
frequent invocation, antisemitism ultimately failed to gamer significant strength as a
unifying ideology in Japan. In drawing this conclusion, two important questions still
linger: why did antisemitism continue and even increase in intensity during the war, and
what need or purpose did it serve in Japan during the 1930s and 1940s? Although these
issues will be specifically addressed in a later chapter, the merits of the frequently
invoked "German pressure" argument will be examined here.
While Japan seemed to be saturated with antisemitism throughout the 1930s and
1940s-in the newspapers, on the radio, and at public exhibitions-it was not a
53 Gerhard Krebs, "The Spy Activities of Diplomat Terasaki Hidenari in the USA and His Role in Japanse-
American Relations," in Ian Neary, ed., Leaders and Leadership in Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996),
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universally accepted ideology. As antisemitic writings and lectures began to appear with
greater frequency in the 1920s, critics from both liberal and conservative camps voiced
their concerns, rejecting the notion of the "metaphorical" Jewish enemy. Yoshino Sakuza,
a professor in the law department ofTokyo Imperial University, was one of the most
outspoken liberals. He denounced antisemitism, concluding that The Protocols was a
reactionary work based on Western prejudice and intended to incite hatred of
Bolshevism: "When I saw that today influential people are attempting to resist new ideas
with this sort of ludicrous gimmick, I began to worry about the potential retarding effect
on our culture ... I could not remain silent.,,54 Uchimura Kanza, an influential author,
Christian theologian, and pacifist, openly admired the Jews and supported the Zionist
cause, as did Bishop Nakada Jiiji, founder of the Japan Holiness Church. Right-wing
nationalists, too, were not unanimously antisemitic. Mitsukawa Kametarou, a
propagandist for Japanese colonialism and colleague ofKita Ikki and Okawa Shiimei,
praised Jewish civilization and rejected the validity of The Protocols in his 1929
publication, Yudayaka no meimou [The Fallacy of the Jewish Peril]. Other rightists
adopted common ancestry theories as a way of tracing the noble origins of Japan:
Professor Fujisawa Chikao argued that Emperor Jimmu was a descendent ofKing
David. 55
From the late 1920s, public support for Jews or, more generally, the West, began
54 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 87.
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to fade as the Japanese government took greater steps to suppress opposition. Japan's
Peace Preservation Law was amended in 1928 to include the death penalty for "thought
crimes," and organizations or movements criticizing the emperor were banned. As part of
its strategy to mobilize the entire Japanese nation for war against China and, later, the
West, the Japanese government passed the National Mobilization Law in 1938, which
sanctioned its control over civilian organizations, established price controls and ration
restrictions, and nationalized industries and news media. Press restrictions increased
every year leading up to 1941, and the number of Japanese newspapers was drastically
reduced.56 Those who expressed dissent for the new regulations were labeled unpatriotic
or traitorous. Most opponents of antisemitism had little choice but to fade from the
public scene in the increasingly xenophobic and anti-Western atmosphere ofthe late
1930s and 1940s. Some even dramatically changed their opinions. Okagami Morimichi
(also known under the pseudonym Kuroda Reiji) had initially expressed criticism for
Hitler and the Nazis in articles for the Asahi Shinbun, but by the 193Os he had accepted
antisemitism, penning several related tracts including "Tale of the Great Scandal of the
Panama Canal: A Perfect Example of Jewish Methods.,,57 Many critics who refused to
alter their stance were blacklisted, such as liberal writer Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, although they
continued to express their concerns in private. Kiyosawa kept a wartime diary in which
he recorded every "childish" antisemitic expression he encountered in magazines and
56 Tom Havens, Valley ofDarkness: The Japanese People and World War Two (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1978),20.
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newspapers, concluding that they were "a disgrace to Japanese intellectuals.,,58
In some cases during the war, publications that supported or praised Jews
managed to evade censorship. In his 1941 book, East Asia and the Jewish Problem,
Koyama Takeo, a self-styled "Jewish specialist," expressed a sense ofgratitude toward
Jews. He cited Jacob Schiff's financial support during the Russo-Japanese War and
suggested that Jewish businesspeople living in Japan had helped open markets for
Japanese goods in the Middle East and Africa. In 1944, Araki Toshima, a famous
Japanese astronomer, discussed various national attitudes towards science in his book,
Nihon seishin to Nihon gakujitsu (Japanese Spirit and Japanese Science). While the
British and Americans saw science as a means for increasing their wealth and power,
Araki argued, Jews envisioned science as a means for promoting human happiness. 59 The
publishing ofthese philosemitic statements suggest that the Japanese government did not
always equate Jews with the Western enemy, revealing that, even among government
censors, there was no monolithic perception of Jews.
Positive interpretations of Jews were not confined to books and articles. In May
1941, less than a year before two major antisemitic exhibitions held in Tokyo and Osaka
warned Japanese about the threat of the "international Jewish conspiracy," the Asahi
Kaikan Museum in Osaka hosted an exhibition titled "The Wandering Jew." Intended to
highlight the suffering ofJewish refugees, "The Wandering Jew" featured twenty-two
photographs ofKobe Jewish refugees taken by members of the Tanpei Photography Club.
58 Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 161.
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39
Since 1935, the Tanpei Club had held more than twenty exhibitions, featuring the work of
some of Japan's preeminent photographers and attracting considerable public attention.
The photos featured at the 23rd Tanpei Exhibition in 1941 were intended to depict human
suffering caused by war. Indeed, in the faces of the Jewish refugees one could clearly
comprehend the sadness and uncertainty caused by their dislocation: some were shown
staring into the distance with forlorn or vacant expressions, while others were shown
sleeping on park benches or tirelessly hauling luggage.
One of the photographers, Kaneyoshi Tabuchi, later expressed his sympathy for
the "Wandering Jews": "What is floating on the wanderer's brow is not only sorrow and
misery ... but also the tenacity of a people gloomily scattered throughout the world. Still
they cannot hide their troubles. It is a battle for them not to be defeated.,,60 Also featured
at the exhibition, alongside photos of the refugees, were pictures ofrecuperating Japanese
soldiers from a nearby military hospital. That the photos of Jewish refugees were
exhibited together with those of Japanese soldiers suggests a sense of equality in
suffering, affording the Jews a sense of humanity that had been stripped from them in
Europe. From the perspective of the wartime regime, however, the exhibit may have also
expressed subtle opposition to the war. A short while after the exhibition, the Tanpei
Photography Club was permanently suspended.61
The victimization of Jews undoubtedly resonated with many Japanese, who were
60 Edward Phillips, ed., Flight and Rescue (Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,
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156,375.
40
well-accustomed to the "Yellow Peril" racism ofWesterners. Outside of the Japanese
government, where there was no knowledge of the Fugu Plan, Japanese citizens often
reacted to Jews in relation to their personal notions of morality. Leo Hanin, a secretary
working for Kobe Jewcom, remembered the hospitality of the Japanese: "When one of
the children became very sick and when the Japanese doctor who was called to treat him
took him to his private hospital, the doctor refused to accept money for his services and
the hospital when he found out the child was a refugee.,,62 According to Hanin, local
Japanese farmers often donated food to Kobe Jewcom: "They came ... with boxes and
boxes of fresh, beautiful apples and oranges and personally presented each child with
some of the fruits." There were anonymous gifts of flowers and money, contributions
from school groups, and instances in which Japanese offered refugees their ration
coupons. Hanin concluded that "there was no antisemitism to the refugees in Kobe, only
compassion and kindness. [The Japanese] were humble, decent, good people.,,63
Altruism was also practiced by certain members of the Japanese government,
although that quality is most commonly associated with Sugihara Chiune (also known as
Sugihara Senp6), the Japanese consul at Kovno from 1939-1941. Sugihara issued
thousands of eight-to-twelve day Japanese transit visas to Jews in 1940, allowing them to
obtain exit visas and leave Lithuania. The Japanese Foreign Ministry instructed Sugihara
only to issue visas to those who had adequate funds and a destination country, but
Sugihara ignored his orders and knowingly approved visas with falsified destinations.
62 Phillips, ed., Flight and Rescue, 108.
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Some estimate that as many as 10,000 Jews escaped Europe through Sugihara's
assistance.64 Although recent evidence suggests that Sugihara may have used diplomatic
loopholes to issue the visas, thereby dampening his "rebel" image, the humanitarianism
of Sugihara cannot be denied.
Although some Japanese were genuinely concerned about the plight of Jews,
Japanese propagandists also recognized a useful purpose in highlighting the victimization
ofJews at the hands of the West. In denouncing Western racism they simultaneously
stressed the need to establish the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, an Asian bloc
guided by the divine rule of the Japanese and free ofWestern influence and racial
discrimination. Indeed, much of Japan's anti-Western sentiment during the 1930s and
1940s focused on racism, most likely the result of real Japanese experiences with
American racial discrimination in the early twentieth century: Japanese immigrants were
forbidden citizenship and could not own land or marry whites in many Western states,
and in California, the children of Japanese immigrants were forced to attend segregated
schools. Japanese immigration to the United States was gradually restricted until 1924,
when it was halted altogether with the Immigration Act.65 Despite its successful
modernization, success in the Russo-Japanese War, and alliance with the victors ofWorld
War I, Japan was not afforded equality with the West, a factor that contributed to its
64 Hillel Levine, In Search o/Sugihara: The Elusive Japanese Diplomat Who Risked His Life to Rescue
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withdrawal from the League ofNations in 1933.
Thus, for many Japanese, the fundamental goal of the Japanese war in the East
was to liberate Asia from the clutches of the racist, imperialist West. Throughout the war,
frequent references were made to America's bleak history with minorities, primarily
within the context of imperialism. In August 1941, the Ministry ofEducation's
ideological manifesto, Shimin no Michi (The Way of the Subject), reminded Japanese that
Western encroachment on Asia was part of a long history of domination: "How were
American Indians treated? What about African Negroes?,,66 In December 1942 and
January 1943, Nippon Times articles claimed that White Americans "slaughtered the
peaceful and meek native Indians and robbed them oftheir land." They also labeled
persecution of Jews a symptom ofWestern discrimination: "they have imposed social
barriers against the Jews that are only slightly less rigid than those imposed on the
negroes and orientals .... That is the way the Anglo-Saxons intend to rule the world.,,67
Expressions of tolerance, coupled with claims that Japan was the protector or savior of
Jews, attributed the Japanese a sense of moral superiority over the West. Bishop Nakada
Jl1ji predicted in 1933 that a war was coming in which Jews would suffer terribly, but
Japan would come to their rescue and lead them back to their ancient homeland, thus
initiating the Second Coming ofChrist.68 In 1939, Inuzuka Koreshige implored Jewish
leaders, "Ifyou would only change your understanding of Japan, you too could submit
66 Dower, War Without Mercy, 26.
67 Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 163-164.
68 Ibid., 164.
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and benefit from the great spirit of Japanese universal brotherhood.,,69 Writing years after
the war, Inuzuka Kiyoko, wife and secretary ofInuzuka, continued to believe that Japan
had been the protector ofJews: "We offered the Jews 'refuge' under Japan's protection
based on the principle of racial equality, without ethnic prejudice and out of respect for
the unique character of the Jewish people.,,70 Thus, under the wing of the racially tolerant
Japanese, the Jews and other races would prosper.
While some Japanese afforded Jews a role in the new order or identified with their
victimization, many possessed only a superficial understanding ofwho Jews were or how
they related to the Japanese war effort. Once again, disconnects between the "real" and
the "metaphorical" made it difficult to determine friend from foe. German-Jewish
philosopher Karl Lowith, who spent part of the war years teaching in Sendai, recalled two
such instances of confusion. On one occasion, a Japanese professor, who was
collaborating on a project with German and Italian scientists, asked Lowith to proofread
his manuscript before sending it to Germany and Italy. In the introduction, the professor
expressed his admiration for Albert Einstein and his appreciation ofLowith's editorial
assistance. When Lowith advised him to omit those statements, the professor appeared
completely dumbfounded: "his understanding ofNazism went no further than the
assumption that Germany and Italy were in favor of the New Order in the East as Japan'
69 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 132.
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conceived it.,,?1 In another instance, Lowith was consulted by a Japanese physician about
helping a Jewish friend escape from Germany. At the same time, however, the man had
joined the German-Japanese Society of Sendai, an organization primarily concerned with
spreading Nazi propaganda and antisemitism.72
With such wide-ranging opinions ofJews circulating in Japanese society, it is not
surprising that antisemitism failed to gain prominence in Japan. Nevertheless, it was not
completely abandoned, and following the forging of the Japanese-German alliance, the
frequency with which the Japanese press invoked anti-Semitism increased. This fact,
coupled with the ghettoization of Shanghai Jews in 1943, led some to conclude that the
Japanese had become puppets ofNazi antisemites. That notion became particularly
strong following Japan's defeat in 1945, a time when the desire to "forget" the war and
reinvent Japanese identity was especially strong. Both Japanese and Westerners sought
different ways of rationalizing the existence ofantisemitism in Japan. One of the most
commonly accepted viewpoints came from Otto Tolischus, a journalist who, in his 1945
book Through Japanese Eyes, translated and commented on selected antisemitic
broadcasts, quotes, and articles. In his commentary, Tolischus immediately found fault
with Germany: "Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many that in aping Nazi methods
[the Japanese] have also adopted anti-Semitism as one oftheir major propaganda
weapons.... The only feature which distinguishes it from the anti-Semitic outpourings of
71 Cheryl A. Silverman, "Jewish Emigres and Popular Images of Jews in Japan," Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University, 1989,86.
72 Ibid.
45
the Nazis is its special stupidity, in which the Japanese pupils surpass their mentors.,,73
While Tolischus's assertions about the Japanese echo other racist tomes ofthe time (such
as the examination of the child-like "Japanese brain" in the infamous documentary Our
Job In Japan), his assumption that Japanese antisemitism was a byproduct ofNazi
influence endures to this day. In analyzing Japanese and Western racism and propaganda
during the war, historian John Dower has claimed that the rise of antisemitism in Japan
was the result of"mindless adherence to Nazi doctrine.,,74 It should be noted that the
Germans achieved a significant level of success in transmitting Nazism and antisemitism
in Japan. However, the Japanese were not simply "aping" their German allies. In reality,
Japanese and Germans were ideologically dissimilar in a number ofways, and their
stance on Jews was just one example ofthat contradiction.
Following the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, the Germans applied
direct pressure on the Japanese public and government to accept Nazism and
antisemitism. At times, the Japanese were more than willing to cooperate. From 1937 to
1938, a mysterious Nazi named E. Spranger gave 80 speeches throughout Japan, mostly
aimed at highlighting similarities between Germans and Japanese (bushido and the
German code ofhonor, the samurai and the Prussian officer, etc.)?5 In 1938, members of
Hitler Youth visited Japan, and the Mainichi Shinbun printed an article lauding their
activities. Soon after, the Mainichi sponsored an exhibition titled "Greater Germany,"
73 Otto D. Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes (New York: Reyna! & Hitchcock, 1945), foreword, 88.
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which was overseen by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. Later, the German Ambassador to Japan, Georg
Stahmer, raised money to translate and publish Nazi material on Jews. At the antisemitic
Tokyo and Osaka exhibitions of 1942-1943 (which were partially organized by the
German Embassy), 32,000 antisemitic brochures were distributed, as were 3,000 copies
ofJuden Hinter Stalin, an antisemitic book by Rudolf Kommos. 76
The Germans also pressured Tokyo to revise its lenient policies toward Jewish
refugees. Inuzuka and Yasue, viewed by Nazis as "friends of the Jews," became
individual targets of criticism, and the Japanese government eventually placed Yasue on
the inactive list while Inuzuka was reassigned to active duty with the Navy. These
dismissals were likely a combination of German pressure and recognition of the
uselessness of "Jewish research" following the failure of the Fugu Plan. In any case,
outright expressions of friendship toward Jews by the Japanese government disappeared
with the signing ofthe Tripartite Pact in September 1940. A fourth convention of the
Jewish communities in the Far East, scheduled for December 1940, was cancelled two
weeks prior to its opening.77
The instances in which Japan yielded to German pressures do not signify slavish
adherence to German will, but indicate Japanese recognition of the importance of
achieving a sense ofunity with their German ally. Many Japanese tried to correlate
76 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 109; Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis, andJews, 485-486.
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Japanese and German interests: "The bonds between Nippon and the Axis states are ...
spiritual ties, designed to create a new culture"; "The Tripartite Alliance ... is a spiritual
union of three countries aimed to bring about eternal peace to World Humanity.,,78
Expressions of antisemitism, too, served as a way to lend support to Germany and
solidify Japanese-German friendship. On March 16, 1938, the Asahi used antisemitism
to bolster its support ofGermany's annexation ofAustria, claiming it was time to "clean
out the Jews." On Nov. 17, in response to Roosevelt's criticism ofthe Kristallnacht
pogrom, the Mainichi claimed, "it is Germany's choice whether to boil the Jews or fry
them in oi1." Later, in a separate article, the Mainchi blamed Germany's defeat in World
War I on Jewish doctors, who were said to have miscalculated the number of food
calories German soldiers needed to sustain the war effort. And in 1943, a Japanese radio
station in Batavia denied rumors of Germany's genocidal campaign against the Jews:
'''The Jews are being exterminated!' goes out the parrot cry. Don't you believe it! When
this present war of emotion has passed there will still be millions of Jews carrying on
their dirty tricks. ,,79
Outside of the press, antisemitism was also invoked to show support for Germany.
In 1938 and 1939, when negotiations for a military alliance with Germany and Italy
deadlocked because Japanese leaders sought a pact against the Soviet Union, radical
propagandists who supported German demands for an alliance against Great Britain and
78 Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes, 131.
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France, including Shioden Nobutaka, made frequent reference to the threat of the Jewish
enemy. 80
Besides offering support to the German cause, Japanese antisemitism in the years
before the Pacific War served to unite two geographically-isolated allies against a
common enemy. Following Germany's invasion ofPoland in 1939, conservative
commentator Ito Ken linked Japan and Germany by claiming that, despite battling on
distant fronts, both nations were struggling against a common foe: the Jews. 81 Fujiwara,
a Japanese delegate to the Weltdienst congress in 1938, labeled Chiang Kai-Shek and
Sun-Vat-Sen Jewish cohorts. He argued that the war in China was not against Chinese,
but a defensive battle against Jewry. In Japan's desperate struggle to rid the world of
Jewish influence, Fujiwara implored the Germans: "Do not abandon us, the isolated
bulwark in the Far East!,,82 Similarly, in Yudaya mondai to Nippon, Inuzuka Koreshige
claimed that Chiang Kai Shek's army depended on Europe and America for its military
power, and on the Jews for economic support.
Antisemitism was also used to weaken domestic criticism of Japan's allies, as
indicated by the Mainichi's explanations in 1943 for the gradually worsening situation in
Italy. On July 29, an editorial suggested that Allied bombings ofRome were the work of
a Jewish conspiracy; on September 12, the Mainichi blamed a Jewish plot for Italy's
surrender; and on April 3, an article claimed that Italy's declaration ofwar against
80 Krebs, "The 'Jewish Problem' in Japanese-Gennan Relations, 1933-1945," 115.
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Germany was the product ofAnglo-American Jewish influence on Italian Jews. 83 In each
case, it was not the inability of the Italians (and, by correlation, the Axis Powers) to
withstand the strength of the Allies that was blameworthy, but rather the devious plans of
Jews working from within.
Despite these shows of support in the late 1930s, many Japanese were skeptical of
the Nazis and their antisemitic policies in the years before the alliance. Ifthe Jewishness
ofAlbert Einstein was insignificant during his visit to Japan in the early 1920s, it was
very apparent to the Japanese by 1933, as indicated by a critical article in the Asahi
Shinbun: "The policy of repression adopted by the German authorities is an
outrage ....We are left aghast. Einstein and Haber have contributed more to the
greatness of Germany than a hundred Hiders....Germany may yet fall victim to its own
policies and come to rue the day it adopted them.,,84 Other journalists dismissed Hider as
a minor aberration, touted the superiority of Japan's military forces, and expressed fear of
the international backlash a Japan-German alliance might bring.85 Thus, like Japanese
intellectuals, some journalists resisted a pro-Nazi stance until government censorship and
the alliance with Germany eliminated or skewed their writings.
Ultimately, the Japanese refused to take the critical step toward outright
persecution of the Jews under their control. According to one source, the Germans
wished to isolate Shanghai Jews on islands near the mouth of the Yangtze before
83 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 109.
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liquidating the entire population.86 Joseph Meisinger, Chief of the Gestapo in the Far
East, suggested that the Jews be loaded onto old, expendable ships, transported to the
open sea, and sunk in their vessels. He also recommended that Jews be worked to death
in Chinese salt mines, or "volunteered" for tortuous medical experiments.87 Pressures for
consolidation increased in the 1940s, and when a ghetto was finally established in 1943,
it appeared that Nazi influence had finally worn down Japanese resistance. The Chief
German Consul ofTientsin, Fritz Wiedemann, testified in 1951 that he was under orders
to "instruct the Japanese authorities about the racial policies of Germany and to suggest
appropriate measures." He concluded with certainty that "the internment ofJews in the
Shanghai ghetto had been instigated by German authorities.,,88
Contrary to the opinion ofWiedemann, it is unlikely that German pressure had a
profound impact on the establishment of the Shanghai ghetto. As previously mentioned,
this ghetto differed dramatically from those in Europe. For the Japanese, the Shanghai
ghetto served the practical purpose of consolidating Jews in a tightly-guarded, fixed
location. While antisemitic stereotypes probably aroused Japanese suspicions of Jews,
legitimate fears of espionage and sabotage likely had a greater impact on the ghetto's
creation. The ghetto was established in the aftermath of the first U. S. air raids against
Japanese cities and the exposure of the Communist spy ring headed by Dr. Richard
86 Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis, and Jews, 478-479.
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Sorge.89 It was certainly plausible that Jewish spies were operating in Shanghai, but the
Kempeitai did not focus exclusively on Jews: at roughly the same time that Jews were
relocated to the ghetto, Allied nationals in Shanghai were interned in separate camps.
Thus, Jews were not the only group subjected to discrimination.90
Ultimately, the alliance between Japan and Germany, as historian Johanna Meskill
notes, was "hollow." In fact, at times, it seemed as though the two nations followed paths
that were quite contradictory and even mutually harmful. Disagreements over territorial
matters, a lack of diplomatic and military coordination, and diverging ambitions plagued
the alliance, leaving it little more than a "purely formal, lifeless arrangement.,,91 The
instances in which the Germans managed to exercise some influence over the Japanese
press and government were outweighed by numerous examples ofJapanese resistance to
German pressures. The survival of Shanghai's Jewish population amidst the Nazi-led
destruction ofEuropean Jewry attests to this fact. However, the Japanese also resisted
other pressures. Throughout the 1930s, for example, Japan welcomed German Jewish
musicians, scientists, educators, and technicians who had lost their jobs in Germany.
There is evidence to suggest that some of the individuals were dismissed as a result of
German pressure, but the Japanese ignored requests to ban records by Jewish artists and
allowed most professionals to keep their jobs. In 1936, the Germans protested when a
part of the Japanese press praised Jewish musicians and their "fight against the despotic
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cultural policy ofNational Socialism." Togo Shigenori, ministerial director ofEuropean
affairs in the Foreign Ministry, responded to German petitions by noting the popularity of
the musicians in Japan and suggesting that their expulsion could be interpreted as an act
of racial discrimination. 92 That same year, Joseph Rosenstock, a talented German-Jewish
conductor, arrived in Japan and established the Nippon Symphony. Rosenstock offered to
step down in 1941 due to Nazis pressures, but his resignation was rejected and he
continued to conduct until 1944. Advertisements for his concerts appeared in the Nippon
Times on various occasions throughout the war.93
Why were the Japanese unwilling to cooperate with the Germans in persecuting
Jews, especially following the failure of the Fugu Plan? One answer likely lies in the
inherent differences between Japanese and German racial ideology. The principles of
Nazi racial theory are most clearly defined in AdolfHitler's autobiography, Mein Kampf
First published in 1925, the book espoused a theory of racial hierarchy placing Aryans at
the apex of civilization, Jews at the bottom, and the remaining races somewhere in
between. By the onset ofWorld War II, Mein Kampfhad been translated into numerous
languages and was read throughout the world. In Japan, portions ofMein Kampfwere
available as early as 1925, and a full translation was completed in 1942. One of the most
popular editions available was Manabe Ryoichi's translation, which was published shortly
92 Krebs, "The 'Jewish Problem' in Japanese-GennanRelations, 1933-1945," 111.
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after Pearl Harbor and renowned for its "accuracy. ,,94 The book sold more than 100,000
copies in its first year of publication, becoming a national best-seller. However, army
censors forced Manabe to revise the book before it was published. While Hitler may
have offered appealing perspectives on the world's "Jewish problem" that resonated with
many Japanese, other aspects ofMein Kampfwere, from a Japanese point ofview, highly
objectionable. In his writings, Hitler clearly expressed his belief in the inferiority of
Japanese civilization:
It is not true, as some think, that Japan adds European technology to its culture;
no, European science and technology are trimmed with Japanese characteristics.
The foundation of actual life is no longer the special Japanese culture, although it
determines the color of life-because outwardly, in consequence of its inner
difference, it is more conspicuous to the European-but the gigantic scientific-
technical achievements ofEurope and America; that is, ofAryan peoples. Only on
the basis of these achievements can the Orient follow the general human progress.
They furnish the basis of the struggle for daily bread, create weapons and
implements for it, and only the outward form is gradually adapted to
Japanese character.95
In Manabe's translation, this section is absent. Also omitted is a passage
suggesting that Japanese culture would "freeze and sink back into the slumber from
which it was wakened seven decades ago by the wave ofAryan culture," as well as a long
section describing why Aryans are "the true culture-founders of this earth.,,96 All told,
more than ten pages were omitted in the Japanese version. Interestingly, after bypassing
94 Sakamoto, Japanese Diplomats and Jewish Refugees, 42.
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Hitler's comparison ofAryan and Oriental cultures, Manabe's text picks up on a section
which begins, "The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew.,,97
Indeed, Hitler's comments about Jews were significant to the Japanese, especially his
statement that Jewry "fears the presence of a national Japanese state in its millennial
Jewish kingdom and desires that the ruin of that state shall precede the establishment of
its own dictatorship.,,98
Mein Kampfrevealed Hitler's true feelings about the Japanese long before accords
and alliances led him to revise his viewpoints and afford the Japanese a place as
"honorary Aryans." More importantly, however, the censorship ofMein Kampfpresents
an obvious example of incompatibility between German and Japanese racial ideology.
For both countries, self-serving racial theories were central to wartime propaganda.
Although antisemitism did not conflict with Japanese world view, Hitler's racial hierarchy
ran contrary to the concept ofhakko ichiu ("eight comers under one roof'), which
suggested that it was the Japanese emperor's divine destiny to lead the world in a new
moral order. The notion ofbeing a borrower ofcivilization, rather than a creator, was
certainly not an idea the Japanese were willing to accept, as evident in its use of that
concept in wartime propaganda against America during the Pacific War.99 The Allies, too,
declared Japan a "third-hand culture" in its wartime rhetoric, suggesting that the emperor
97 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 300; Manabe, Waga Toso, 267.
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99 Nippon Times, 18 January 1943,2. "[America] has transplanted into her soil the old manufactured stuff
called European civilization in its original fonn and pretends herself to be a civilized nation."
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"never invented anything important ofhis own, but copied everything he saw."IOO
The adoption of racial antisemitism contradicted Japan's purported racial
tolerance, as expressed in a statement by Koyama Takeo in 1941: "From its inception in
ancient times, the Yamato Race has always treated with love and understanding those
peoples who have submitted to us, and we have never abused or harmed them in any
way."IOI Koyama concluded that European antisemitism was not appropriate for Japan
and that Jews should be dealt with in the spirit ofuniversal brotherhood. While racial
harmony and equality were certainly not practiced in reality by the Japanese, it was
essential that they refrain from casting the conflict as a race war. Still, Japanese belief in
the inherent superiority of the Yamato race never waned, a notion that could not be
reconciled with German views ofAryan supremacy.
In 1933, the Nazis introduced the Law for Restoration of the Public Service,
which stated that "officials of non-Aryan origin are to be retired.,,102 Although aimed at
German Jews, the law raised concerns in Japan: were they considered non-Aryans?
Memories of the early twentieth century "Yellow Peril" scare, a term Kaiser Wilhelm
claimed to have personally coined, were still fresh in the Japanese mind. 103 Germany's
initial refusal to exclude Japan from the classification of "colored races," as well as its
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prohibition of marriage between Germans and non-Aryans or "colored" people in 1935,
strained the Japanese-German relationship. When hopes of an alliance led the Germans
to adopt a pro-Japanese policy in 1938, they quickly sought to remedy the race issue by
forbidding the media's use of the term "Yellow Peril." Soon after, Japanese achievements
were singled out as evidence of its particular "racial genius.,,104 Despite these efforts, the
Japanese were well aware of the discriminatory racial policy Germany pursued at home
and they were doubtful a different policy would be pursued abroad.
In addition to the blatant differences in Japanese and German racial ideology,
German anti-Semitism also conflicted with a Japanese tendency to classify "real" Jews
according to their nationality, rather than their race or religion. That mindset was clearly
evident in the Japanese consuls' treatment of Jewish refugees. From the mid-1930s, the
Foreign Ministry advised its ambassadors to treat refugees who were German citizens as
German nationals in accordance with Japanese law. Germans did not need transit visas
for Japan, just as Japanese did not need transit visas for Germany. Although the passports
of Jews were labeled with a large letter "J," Japanese consuls seldom emphasized the
racial backgrounds of visa applicants. Lists and charts of applicants for visas almost
always referred to nationality. 105 Because of Japan's alliance with Germany, German
Jews were afforded higher status than Jews from other countries. Ironically, the link to
Nazi Germany granted German Jews a certain degree of protection in Japanese-controlled
areas. After the outbreak of the war in China in 1937, the Japanese consul general in
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Tientsin suggested that Jews living there hoist the Swastika flag for their protection in
case of approaching Japanese troops. 106 The German Foreign Ministry promptly rejected
that suggestion, but the incident indicates that the racial and ethnic identities ofJews
were subordinated to their national identities.
It should also be noted that, due to the primacy ofnationality over race, not all
Jews were consolidated in the Shanghai ghetto in 1943. Only those classified as
"stateless" (from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia) were forced into the ghetto. Jews from Middle Eastern countries, such as
Iraq, were exempt, and Japan's delicate relationship with the Soviet Union during the
1940s prevented the ghettoization ofRussian Jews. 107 "Real" Jews, therefore, were not
viewed as a collective race by the Japanese, but as diverse groups of nationals with
different languages and customs. Still, they were sometimes grouped together as the
"Jewish enemy" for propaganda purposes. In a radio broadcast on May, 5, 1943,
Shanghai was decried as "a paradise for Jewish adventurers," where Jews "were
responsible for large-scale introduction of opium" and had control of commercial and
financial life. 108 This announcement came just fifteen days prior to the deadline for
evacuation to the Jewish ghetto in Shanghai, suggesting that, in this case, antisemitism
may have served to soften public admonition and dissent. The Japanese justified the
ghettoization ofgroups that had little or no connection with each other, let alone with
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Japan's wartime enemies, by invoking the mythical "Jewish enemy."
Despite the German-Japanese alliance and the efforts of German antisemites, the
Japanese did not adopt the German form of racial antisemitism. In that respect,
Matsuoka's statement to Lev Zikman was accurate. As ostensible champions of racial
equality, the Japanese government could not officially embrace antisemitism, nor could
the war against the "Jewish enemy" appear to be a driving force ofthe Japanese war
effort, as it was in Germany. Because they could neither accept Aryan supremacy nor
advocate the destruction ofother ethnic groups, Japanese were forced to pick and choose
those aspects ofHitler's platform they found most useful. However, if Germany's role as
ideological transmitters was minimal and the Japanese themselves, through their various
opinions ofJews, were not ideologically united under antisemitism, why did it survive in
Japan throughout the 193Os and 1940s? In order to answer this question, it is imperative
to contextualize antisemitism within Japanese imaginings of foreigners and, more
specifically, Westerners. Doing so reveals that antisemitism was not simply an aberration
in Japanese history, but rather a continuation of a centuries-old Japanese obsession with
the "Other."
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CHAPTERN
THE JEWISH ENEMY: FOUNDATIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF JAPANESE
ANTISEMITISM
In January 1943, a major exhibition opened at Tokyo's Matsuya Department Store
with the sponsorship ofthe Mainichi Shinbun and support ofthe Japanese government's
Information Board. Titled "Free Masonry and Its Secret International Influence," the
month-long Tokyo exhibition, along with a second held in Osaka, reportedly drew more
than one million visitors. 109
An advertisement in the Nippon Times highlighted the purpose of the exhibition:
It's Jews that dare to invade Nippon by manipulating a double-headed monster,
America and Britain. We should make every endeavor to bring that dreadful
monster to broad daylight at all cost. ...That dreadful power of Free Masonry is
working in secret and silence against us under the cover ofAmerica and Britain in
military, economic, and thought warfares....The sole aim ofthis exhibition is
intended to expose the secret Jewish machinations in order to annihilate America
and Britain. [10
In this instance of Japanese antisemitism, as in many others throughout the war,
"Jews" became synonymous with the Allied enemy (or, in other contexts, "America,"
109 Kase, "Nihon no naka no Yudayajin," 243; Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis, and Jews, 485; Although the title
of the exhibition did not include "Jews," the linkage between Jews and Freemasons was an idea
imbedded in the The Protocols and supported by antisemites around the world (Cohn, Warrant for
Genocide, 28-31). In Mein Kampf, Hitler described Freemasonry as a "weapon in the service of Jews,"
and its practice was eventually outlawed in Germany (Hitler, Mein Kampf, 315). In Japan, too,
Freemasonry and Judaism were often used interchangeably.
110 Nippon TImes, 21 January 1943, 8.
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"Britain," "the West," "Anglo-Saxonism," or "Anglo-Americanism"). At times, that
correlation was strikingly obvious. David Kranzler notes that certain antisemitic books,
such as Yudaya-jin no inbo to hainichi mondai (The Jewish Conspiracy and the Anti-
Japanese Problem), contained the word "Jew" in their titles but not in their text ("the
West," "Britain," or the United States" served as substitutes). In fact, the negative values
attributed to Jews by Japanese antisemites had long been associated with the non-
Japanese "Other" (most often the West). For some Japanese, the Jewish conspiracy
provided a useful explanation for the Western tendency to dominate nations and exploit
peoples, as well as their impure individualism, materialism, and greed. Thus, the Tokyo
exhibition not only echoed typical antisemitic criticisms ofJews found in The Protocols,
it also reflected Japanese criticisms of the West that had existed for centuries, as evident
in the titles of several exhibits: "What is Materialism?"; "Destruction ofHumanity";
"Anti-Japanese Campaign of Jews"; "True Cause ofthe Outbreak of the Present World
War"; "Peculiar Manipulations of Jews."llI These titles illustrate the variety ofways the
Jewish "Other" was used in prewar and wartime Japan: highlighting its negative,
purportedly non-Japanese characteristics (i.e. materialism, treachery); emphasizing its
desire to oppose and ultimately dominate other nations, including Japan; and referencing
its threat to "humanity" to reinforce Japan's self-appointed position as the champion of
equality, morality, and the savior of not just Asia, but mankind.
III Nippon Times, 21 January 1943, 8. Interestingly, none of the titles included the word "Freemasonry."
The remaining exhibits included: "Lists of Monarchs and Dignitaries Assassinated"; "Protocols";
"Double-sided Policy of Red and Black"; "Wordy and Monarchial Court Warfares" ; "Oriental Policy";
"China Incident"; "Reform of China's Monetary System"; "Sian Incident, Outbreak of China Incident";
"European War"; and "Outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia."
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Throughout Japanese history, the "Other"- usually defined as the West or, in the
past, China-was used as a counter-image of Japanese identity. That practice was
certainly not unique to Japan: in White American imaginings ofNative Americans,
British myths ofAfrica, sixteenth century European artistic representations ofNew World
inhabitants, as well as inventions of a unified "Orient" and "Islarn," Western cultures
have frequently invoked the backwardness of the "Other" to solidify their claims of
superiority.1l2 In Japan, "Others" have been objects ofboth emulation and criticism, but
in either case they have defined Japanese identity through the anti-image of
"foreignness."IB Centuries before the arrival of The Protocols, Japanese used outsiders
to establish their uniqueness as a symbol of their special favor among the gods and
centrality in world affairs. The West, too, helped define what was uniquely Japanese. It
is not possible to reduce all aspects of Japanese relations with the West into a single mode
of action or a single strain of thought, as reactions and ramifications were complex and
diverse. However, there were certain characteristics ofJapanese conceptions of the West
that transcended historical periods. Especially at times ofnational uncertainty-whether
caused by the arrival ofWestern missionaries or Commodore Perry's gunboats, or by the
rapid Westernization of Japanese society, humiliation ofWestern racism and, ultimately,
the onset ofthe Pacific War-"the West" (the definition of which evolved over time)
could be viewed as a destroyer of indigenous cultural values that, whether in reality or
imagination, were said to have always been fundamental to Japanese identity. Fears of
112 Silvennan, "Jewish Emigres and Popular Images of Jews in Japan," 15-16.
113 Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan (New York: Routledge, 1992), 11.
62
Western domination inspired national cohesiveness, resulting in the creation ofan
imagined community in which Japanese were ethnically and culturally bound to one
another. Through "the imaginative power of nationalism" Japanese juxtaposed their
purity, morality, spirituality, humanity, and collectivity alongside the antithetical
"Other.,,1l4 In the wartime atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s, as in other instances of
national uncertainty, the Japanese were compelled to reiterate their unique identity and
superiority in order to unite and organize the nation for a protracted, total war.
For antisemites, Jews could be either the carriers ofWestern civilization or the
products of it, but in either case they were cast as the "demonic other" in contrast to the
"pure" Japanese, a long-standing fixture of Japanese relations with "Others." As a
universal enemy, Jews were simultaneously democratic, socialist, capitalist, communist,
liberal, individualistic, materialistic, cowardly, and dominating. Existing only in myth,
the "Jewish enemy" could not retaliate against such accusations, and the Allied countries'
record of Jewish mistreatment, combined with the indifference evident in their rejection
of Jewish refugees, meant little fear of counter-propaganda. In fact, Japanese
antisemitism was lent legitimacy not only by Japan's Axis partners, but by its Allied
enemies as well. America, for example, was home to more than one hundred antisemitic
organizations by 1939. 115 A variety offactors influenced that increase, including
114 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread a/Nationalism
(London: Verso, 2006), 158.
115 Leonard Dinnerstein, "Antisemitism in Crisis Times in the United States: The 1920s and 1930s," in
Sander L. Gilman and Steven T. Katz, 008., Anti-Semitism in Times a/Crisis (New York: New York
University Press, 1991),218-219.
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nativism inspired by the rise of scientific racism and economic depression, as well as the
association of Jews with radicalism and communism. However, distrust or hatred of Jews
was not confined to the radical fringe of society. Respected figures such as Charles
Lindbergh and Henry Ford did not hesitate to publicly express their antisemitic views. In
his book The International Jew (which included a translation of The Protocols), Ford
suggested that Jews controlled world finance, manipulated governments, and had a
majority stake in American big business and media. He also surmised that the true intent
of Zionists was to create a master state, Israel, and force other nations to serve as its
vassals. 116
Japanese antisemites also frequently referenced The Protocols, echoing the
accusations made by Western antisemites such as Ford. The threat ofAnglo-American
Jewry, while frequently referenced in Japanese antisemitism, was also widely voiced in
German antisemitic circles. Yet despite these similarities, suggesting that Japanese
antisemitism was merely "adopted" from abroad risks oversimplification. "Adapted" is
perhaps a more useful term, as it implies that Japanese antisemitism was a product of
foreign influence yet served a distinct Japanese purpose. For Japanese antisemites, the
Jewish conspiracy answered a historical imperative for the Japanese to define themselves
against the Western enemy, and it offered a convenient rationale for the West's history of
domination, its racism and anti-Japanese sentiment, and even its purported instigation of
World War ll. It mattered little that Japanese contact with Jews had been historically
116 Henry Ford, The International Jew (New York: Filiquarian Publishing, 2007),8-12.
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sparse. Tropes of the "Other" often exist regardless of real contact or endure beyond the
physical presence of the "Others" themselves. In sixteenth-century China, for example,
Japanese were often referred to as "dwarfpirates," a label based on real Chinese
experiences with Japanese marauders' in the distant past. 117 That most "dwarfpirates"
were actually Chinese by the sixteenth century did not prevent stereotypes of the
Japanese as "black demons" and "bloodthirsty sharks" from persisting long into the
future. 118
Antisemitic stereotypes have also endured in areas where few Jews have
historically resided, based on skewed memories of contact with "real" Jews and
exacerbated by myths from the outside world. Although Jews were excluded from
England in 1290, antisemitic Christian attitudes formed prior to expulsion lived on
through preachers, playwrights, writers, and storytellers, the "the molders of public
opinion."119 Actual contact with Jews was not necessary to maintain antisemitism, but by
preserving and publicizing Jewish myths and stereotypes, English antisemites ensured
that, when Jews returned to England in 1656, few greeted them with open arms.
Although the Japanese did not have significant physical contact with Jews prior to
the 1930s, they laid the groundwork for sustaining antisemitism centuries before.
117 Wang Yong, "Realistic and Fantastic Images of 'Dwarf Pirates': The Evolution ofMing Dynasty
Perceptions of Japanese," in Joshua A. Fogel, 00., SagaciousMonks and Bloodthirsty Warriors: Chinese
Views ofJapan in the Ming-Qing Period (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2002), 37.
118 Ibid.
119 Bernard Glassman, Anti-Semitic Stereotypes Without Jews: Images ofthe Jews in Eng/and, 1290-1700
(Detroit, IL: Wayne State University Press, 1975),9, 14-15.
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Japanese contact with foreign "Others" occurred from at least the third century, when
Chinese, Koreans, and Manchurians were known to have established small settlements in
Japan. At the same time, a number ofJapanese visited China, which was viewed as the
model "Other" for much ofJapan's early history. Regardless, the Japanese soon
developed their own visions of superiority.
From at least the eighth century, the opposition of"purity" and "impurity" shaped
the Japanese world view. In 712, the Kojiki (The Chronicle ofAncient Matters) described
the most important Japanese gods as being born out ofpurification rites. 120 Those
practices, fundamental to Shinto, became an essential part ofensuring not only the purity
of the Japanese body, but also the mind and spirit. The Japanese translated their
"cleanliness" into virtuosity and godliness, developing a distinction between inside and
outside (pure and impure) that resulted in a world vision in which divine Japan ("The
Land ofthe Gods") assumed the leading role. While China was long held in high regard
as a model of emulation, its frequent infiltration by "barbarians" dampened its position of
superiority from the Japanese perspective. Gradually, the notion of Japanese centrality
appeared in foreign relations and discussions of politics, especially during diplomatic
crises. 121
In 1270, the Kamakura Shogunate (1192-1333) rejected Khubilai Khan's demand
that Japan submit to his control or face invasion by the Mongol armies. The centrality of
120 Emiko Ohnuki-Tiemey, Illness and Culture in Contemporary Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984), 35-38.
121 Ronald Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development ofthe Tokugawa
Bakufu (Stanford. CA: Stanford University Press, 1984),223.
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Japan in Japanese world view made the idea offoreign rule inconceivable, and the
Mongols' unsuccessful invasion attempts in the 1290s only reinforced the myth of
Japanese divinity. That notion of superiority was somewhat shaken, although not
displaced, by the arrival ofPortuguese and Spanish missionaries in the late 1500s. The
strange dress and customs of the nanbanjin ("southern barbarians") became the subject of
much fascination. The barbarians were said to come from a land of beasts, as evident by
their hairy faces and terrible smells, and they were often described or depicted as having
bestial features. One of the first accounts ofJapanese contact with the Western
missionaries, Kirishitan Monogatari (Tale of the Christians), described the creatures
disembarking from the first nanbanjin ships as having sharp claws, yellow, owl-like eyes,
large teeth like a horse, and long manes of hair. The "padres" were seen as ludicrous or
pitiable creatures, but also as objects of fear, as it was said that they were witches and
magicians, practicers of "demonic trickery" who intended to tum Japan into a "Realm of
the Beasts.,,122 In the first century ofcontact, the terminology describing the West
revealed the obvious link to barbarism: Christianity was referred to as banshfi ("the
barbarian sect"), Western studies were sometimes known as bangaku ("barbarian
studies"), and the governments' bureau for translating Western books was known as
Bansh6 Shirabesho (Barbarian Works Investigation Bureau). 123
Shortly after the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate (1600-1868),
122 George Elison, Deus Destroyed: The Image ojChristianity in Early Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1973), 125, 144,214-216,232-233,321,450-451,457.
123 Ibid., Deus Destroyed, 450, 496.
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government fears ofWestern infiltration through religious conversion resulted in the
banishment of Christianity and expulsion ofWesterners. Although contacts with the West
were limited over the next two centuries, Japanese captivation with the Western
nanbanjin endured. They were commonly featured in Japanese paintings and sculptures,
and they were even mimicked at elitist costume balls. Following the exclusion of
Westerners, the Japanese reverted to Koreans, Ryiikyiians, and Chinese for tropes of
"Otherness." However, "barbaric" Western features, such as beards, plumed hats, frilled
collars, and boots, were transposed on Japanese visual representations ofEast Asian
"Others." In addition, Japanese artists began to depict nanbanjin not only in their native
habitat, as they had in the past, but also in Japanese settings. Thus, the previously "out
there" nanbanjin were afforded status as foreign occupiers and cultural usurpers, if only
in the Japanese imagination. Undoubtedly, the potential ofthe Western "Other" to
dominate "The Land of the Gods" aroused feelings ofboth awe and fear in Japan that
persisted long after contact with the West had ceased. 124
By the time Commodore Perry's black ships steamed into Tokyo Bay in 1853, it
was clear that the Western "Other" had become more than an object of Japanese curiosity.
Many denounced the Western intrusion and its potential to damage the "unique Japanese
spirit." In his 1825 Shinron (New Theses), Aizawa Seishisai advocated emperor-centered
state Shinto and developed the idea of the unique national polity (kokutai) in hopes of
unifying the Japanese people against the threat ofthe West. He also claimed that
124 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, 334, 351.
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Christianity, an "occult religion," was a vital part of a Western global conspiracy to
destroy the Japanese:
The barbarians employ occult religions and other mysterious doctrines to seduce
foreign people into their fold. Should the barbarians win our commoners over to
their cause, their paucity ofnumbers would become a great multitude. . .. These
barbarians will settle for nothing less than subjugating the rulers of all nations and
conscripting peoples of all peoples into their ranks. ,,125
Aizawa's writings helped spark a movement to "revere the emperor, expel the
barbarians" among the Tokugawa shogunate and its supporters. Although that revolt was
ultimately unsuccessful, Japanese fears ofgeographical, spiritual, and cultural usurpation
remained a fixture of Japanese relations with the Western world well into the twentieth
century. Antisemitism fit nicely within that long-standing animosity, as evident in a
statement made in 1942 by Shiratori Toshio, a member of the Diet and former
ambassador to Sweden and Italy: "The aim ofthe Jews is to establish hegemony over the
world, by the grace ofJehovah their racial god, in order to force mankind to worship that
deity.... This scheme is absolutely incompatible with our imperial institution .... The
present war is therefore a struggle between the Japanese and the Jews."126
While Shiratori's statement bears a striking resemblance to the writings ofAizawa,
it is not the only instance of similarity between the anti-Western writings of the past and
the antisemitic language of the 1930s and 1940s. In many cases, one need only substitute
the words "Jews" or "Judaism" for the terms "occult religion" and "Western barbarians,"
125 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 18.
126 Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 159.
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as David Goodman and Miyazawa Masanori have done in examining an anti-Christian
tract by Ohashi Totsuan:
Now, the intentions of the [Jews] in promoting trade are roundly to be despised
and deeply to be feared. As I have said before, their aims are grounded in the
[Judaism] that is their guiding principle. The fundamental aim of the [Jews] is to
annex all countries of the world, to treat them as undifferentiated members of the
same world order, and to make their national polities, their institutions, and their
religions uniform throughout. In order to achieve this goal, the [Jews] must first
involve themselves in every aspect oflife and subvert people's minds.,,127
References to Western beastliness and barbarism continued into the twentieth
century, eventually becoming commonplace in Japanese wartime propaganda. At times,
that beastliness was literal. Westerners were depicted in cartoons in a variety of animal
forms, from reptiles to dogs, sparrows to fish. 128 Jews, too, took on animal qualities.
Tokyo radio announced that Jews were "extending their tentacles" into the commercial
and financial life in Shanghai, and journalist Takeda Seigo labeled international Jewry a
"vicious mad dog" who would stop at nothing to achieve its goals. 129
In other cases, the inhuman attributes of barbarians were referenced to define
what was "Japanese" by highlighting the immoral or impure characteristics of the enemy.
As was true in descriptions of the demonic and conspiratorial Christians in the Tokugawa
and Meiji Periods, Westerners were described as treacherous and cowardly. However,
127 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 27-28.
128 Dower, War Without Mercy, 239-241.
129 Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes, 92; Takeda, Shinbun to Yudayajin [Newspapers and the Jews]
(Tokyo: Oa Tsushinsha, 1944),3.
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those features were not only ascribed to "the West" but also to other Japanese enemies.
In the late nineteenth century, the Japanese government and media cast the Sino-Japanese
War as a battle between civilization and barbarism, and the Chinese enemy was depicted
as easily corruptible and cowardly. Later, during the conquest ofManchuria, the
Japanese Army distributed an army propaganda pamphlet claiming that Chinese forces
would invariably retreat in the wake ofJapanese assault, after which they would quickly
tum to banditry. 130 In the Pacific War, Jews, too, were associated with cowardice and
treachery. In 1942, a manzai group called The Lucky Seven Team created a popular
routine known as "The Pacific Sumo War," which described a fictional sumo match
between the Japanese Hayabusa fighter plane and the Allies' Boeing B-17. 131 The B-17
was described as "originally from Yankee prefecture, in the country of the Jews, from a
pirate village.... His specialty is fleeing into the mists of the clouds.,,132
While the Japanese desire to "expel the barbarians" continued through World War
II, it is important to note that Japan's relationship with the West was not inherently
antithetical through history. With the onset ofthe Meiji Period (1868-1912), a crash
program ofcultural borrowing was adopted under a new slogan, "revere the emperor,
emulate Western civilization.,,133 As had been true with China in the past, the Japanese
130 Lousie Young, Japan:S Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture ofWartime Imperialism (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1998), 98; Gluck, Japan:S Modern Myths, 135.
131 Kushner, The Thought War, 109. Manzai is a type of stand-up comedy in the style ofAbbot and
Costello, featuring two-comedians trading jokes at a rapid pace.
1321bid.
133 Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, "Introduction," in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ed., Modern Japanese Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),3.
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began to define their progress in tenns of their compatibility with the "Other." The
Japanese government argued that Westernization was the key to achieving bunmei karka
("civilization and enlightenment"). In order to regain its rightful position of superiority
in international affairs, the Japanese people were instructed to "search for new knowledge
throughout the world" and to "eliminate old customs based on the universal way.,,134
Admiration for Western culture continued into the twentieth century. By the end
ofWorld War I, many Japanese viewed America as the leading consumer culture and the
ultimate symbol of modernity, and the tenns amerikanizumu ("Americanism") and
amerikanaizeishon ("Americanization") became representative of Japanese
consumerism. 135 In addition, new Japanese identities emerged with the rise of the middle
class and the modernization of Japanese life achieved in large part through
Westernization. The moho and moga (modem boys and modem girls) of the 1920s, for
example, represented a new, cosmopolitan Japanese with their Western outfits, love of
material objects, frequent visits to cafes and jazz clubs, and public displays ofero, guro,
nansensu (erotic, grotesque, nonsense). According to one magazine of the period, they
possessed an international outlook, but were also loyal and patriotic citizens. 136
Japan's successful modernization, achieved in large part through Western
134 Tetsuo Najita and H.D. Haritoonian, "Japan's Revolt Against the West," in Wakabayashi, ed., Modern
Japanese Thought, 208-209.
135 Barbara Sato, The New Japanese Woman: Modernity, Media, and Women in Interwar Japan (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 31.
136 Ibid., 63-66.
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influence, could not be ignored by the Japanese, even in the increasingly anti-Western
atmosphere of the late 1930s and 1940s. Yet the mythical Jewish enemy, while often
associated with the West, was also referred to as an enemy apart. In that way, it did not
assume any of the positive characteristics ofWesterners, nor did it have a role in the
modernization of Japan. Attacking the Jewish enemy was a convenient way to bypass
comparisons with the West, as well as the debate concerning whether Japan was a
"culture borrower" or "culture creator," the latter ofwhich was fundamental to Japanese
wartime propaganda. For some antisemites, the Jewish enemy was the victimizer ofthe
world, and even Westerners could be portrayed as casualties ofJewish domination and
treachery. In a 1942 article in the Yomiuri-HOichi, Akita Shigetoki accused Jewish
doctors of spreading flu epidemics in America and Europe in order to weaken Western
society.137 Diet member Shiratori Toshio claimed in 1944 that "... there is no democracy
in the US, and the American masses know nothing. A clique ofJews, numbering less
than twenty and headed by Roosevelt, has been running the US for the last twelve
years....,,138 In an article titled "Inferior America," the Mainichi blamed Jews for
sending the "uneducated, uncultured, and ill-mannered" Americans to the front to be
slaughtered en masse, and on Tokyo radio, the "problem" ofAmerican juvenile
delinquency was attributed to the immoral Jewish front in America. 139 In separate
broadcasts, Jews were said to have "forced the peace-loving American people into this
137 Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 162.
138 Ibid., 160.
139 Ibid., 162; Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes, 89.
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war," and Yogotaka Ashirdin, President of the Nippon Moslem Association, reported that
"... the Anglo-Americans are suffering from the pressure of the Jews. It is these Jews
who are the root cause of the war.,,140
Of course, not all Japanese viewed Westerners as victims, or even as models of
emulation. The current of anti-Westernism that existed alongside positive interpretations
ofWesternization or Americanization grew dramatically in the years following World
War I. Drastic changes in domestic and international circumstances, including economic
depression, political reorganization, militarism, and international isolation, increased
fears of the West. In addition, the rise in Japanese consumption ofWestern goods, along
with the actions of "West-worshipping" individuals such as the moho and moga,
increased anxiety among intellectuals, who feared the supplanting ofnative tradition by
the "hedonistic culture" of the Americans. Takasu Yoshijiro, founder of the
ultranationalist New Oriental Society, argued that Japanese consumerism was
increasingly imitating America, in which men and women "lost themselves to jazz and
dance.,,141 Japanese newspapers, too, targeted the "Western infection" that threatened
Japan's national culture, often criticizing the Westernizing excesses of high society.142
Japanese anti-Westernism ofWorld War II continued to highlight aspects of
cultural hedonism deemed "un-Japanese" and, therefore, indicators ofAllied weakness of
140 Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes, 91.
141 Sato, The New Japanese Woman, 38.
142 Ibid., 72; Jordan Sand, House and Home in Modern Japan: Architecture, Domestic Space, and
Bourgeois Culture, 1880-1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 186, 217-218.
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character and spirit. The West was often described as a place of individualism, where a
focus on profit-making contributed to selfishness and greed. That notion was evident in
The Way ofthe Subject, an ideological manifesto published by the Ministry ofEducation
in 1942, which suggested that American Western expansion was the result of an insatiable
appetite for local resources and markets. 143 The media also frequently referenced the
impurity ofWestern life and its threat to Japanese society:
[The Americans] gathered the money of the whole world by her products obtained
from the land and soil ofher usurpation.... In less than a century she has made
herself a mighty Power of the world. . . . But in their spiritual life the Americans
of today differ little from their vagabond forefathers who dreamt of making a
fortune at a stroke. . . . No nation is so poor and feeble in its spiritual life. 144
Jews were also associated with materialism. Takeda Seigo feared the Anglo-
Americanization of Japanese life that Jewish control ofworld politics, economies,
ideologies, and cultures would bring: "We must sweep clean the existence of the
materialistic, aggressive ideology of the Anglo-American Jews and then repair
morality.,,145 Takeda viewed jazz, sex films, mixed dances, and permissiveness as aspects
of "Jewish culture." The editor ofMainichi also lamented the appearance of materialistic
"Jewish culture" in Japan, as evident in an increase in vending machines and ready-made
foods. 146
143 Dower, War Without Mercy, 24.
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Throughout modern Japanese history, contact with the West inspired a sense of
unity, both real and imagined, in response to fears of encroachment on Japanese ways of
life. While calling for Westernization, the Meiji reformers attempted \0 preserve notions
of Japanese superiority over foreigners as well as the myth of Japanese cultural similitude.
In the decree proclaiming the Meiji Restoration, Japanese leaders called for a return to
Japan's ancient roots, a time before the corrupting influences ofBuddhism and Chinese
civilization, by reestablishing the emperor as the nation's ruler. Like the nation-states of
Europe and America, Japan did not enter the modern era with a strong sense of national
identity despite its relatively high degree of common ethnicity, language, and culture.
Thus, the Meiji leaders used the "invented tradition" of unbroken dynastic succession to
instill a consciousness of "imperial subjects" among Japanese. In doing so they created a
memory of an emperor-centered history that had never actually existed, but helped bring
"the common people into a highly disciplined national community and a unified and
totalizing culture.,,147
As Japan struggled to define its niche in the international order in the late
nineteenth century, minkan ("among the people") ideologues-journalists, intellectuals,
and public figures who "produced a disproportionate amount of the 'public opinion"'-
used defensive nationalism to attack the foreign in order to define what was Japanese. 148
Cultural nationalists concerned themselves with the distinctiveness of the Japanese
147 Stephen Vlastos, "Tradition: PastlPresent Culture and Modern Japanese History," in Stephen Vlastos, ed.,
Mirror o/Modernity: Invented Traditions o/Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
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cultural community as the essence of the nation, suggesting that particular cultural traits
were intrinsic to the Japanese people. Kinship, religion, and race were combined to
create a sense of collectivity or oneness, a "family nation.,,149 The loss of those unique
traits, for some, was equivalent to the destruction of the Japanese nation. In the 1880s,
Kuga Katsunan, editor of the newspaper Nihon, argued, "If a nation wishes to stand
among the great powers and preserve its national independence, it must strive always to
foster nationalism.... If the culture of one country is so influenced by another that it
completely loses its own unique character, that country will surely lose its independent
footing." 150
According to sociologist Kosaku Yoshino, cultural nationalism "aims to
regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people's
cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking, inadequate, or threatened." 151 Thus, for
Kuga and others, nationalism was a defense mechanism, and a unified nation was seen as
crucial to forestalling international threats. Inoue Tetsujiro, one of the most prolific
ideologues ofcivil morality in the Meiji period, expressed that sentiment:
"Since there are those that swallow countries with impunity, we must consider the
whole world our enemy.... Foreign enemies are always watching for any lapse
on our part, and then we can rely only upon our forty million fellow countrymen.
Thus, any true Japanese must have a sense of public duty, by which he values his
life lightly as dust, advances spiritedly, and is ready to sacrifice himself for the
149 Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, 1; Bruce Armstrong, "Racialisation and
Nationalist Ideology: The Japanese Case" in International Sociology 4, no. 3 (1989): 338.
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sake of the nation.,,152
Inoue concluded that the Japanese must "prepare for any emergency by nurturing
the spirit of collective patriotism." 153 These notions of fear, combined with a strong
desire to achieve unification, became a fixture of the defensive cultural nationalism that
would continue, albeit at various levels of intensity, through World War II.
The sense of collective sacrifice and unity were fundamental to Japanese
propaganda in World War II. According to the Ministry ofEducation's Kokutai no Hong;
(Cardinal Principles of the National Polity), Japanese unity was found in their "cloudless,
pure, and honest" national character. The Yamato Race was divinely descended from the
emperor, and the nation was said to have developed "on the basis of a pure, unclouded,
and contrite heart" from which all Japanese customs, habits, and language emanated.
One of the most famous slogans of the era was introduced to the Japanese public the day
after the Pearl Harbor attack: "One hundred million advancing like a ball offlame." To
carry on a protracted war against America, it was argued, unification of the "unique racial
power" of the Japanese people was essential. 154
Like anti-Western propagandists, Japanese antisemites stressed the importance of
national unity for defeating the Jewish enemy. They often espoused ethnic nationalism,
suggesting that the supposed homogeneity ofthe Japanese race was fundamental to the
152 Gluck, Japan:S Modern Myths, 130.
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well-being of the Japanese nation. As early as 1925, Shi5den Nobutaka linked the
concepts of nation and ethnicity in declaring that the war against Jews was a battle to
preserve the "unique and unrivaled Imperial Institution of Japan, its Kokutai." Protecting
the emperor from the Jews was part of the "perfect and flawless mission of the Yamato
Race" that would "not only serve Japan but all the nations of the world." 155 According to
both anti-Westemists and antisemites, foreign influence and ideologies were weak in
comparison to the Japanese kokutai. Atago Hokuzan suggested that democracies were
particularly susceptible to Jewish influence and that Japanese expressions of ethnic
nationalism were tantamount to "the extent to which they have thrown off the Jewish
yoke.,,156 In Yudaya minsoku no tai niche Kosei (The Jewish Offensive Against Japan),
Teiichi Muto chastised those who sought Jewish friendship, as "the Jewish policies of
capitalism, communism and democracy are fundamentally such that they and our national
structure cannot survive together." 157
The importance of race and state were also clearly expressed by Inuzuka
Koreshige and Yasue Norihiro. In his 1939 "Letter to the Leaders ofthe Jews," Inuzuka
contrasted the superiority ofthe Japanese race with Jewish statelessness: "In contrast to
the Yamato race, who are flourishing in concert with the universe through our all-
encompassing character, the fact that you Jews who pride yourselves on your own
superiority have had no country of your own for 2,000 years demonstrates that the
155 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 127.
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guiding spirit of your race runs counter to the spirit of the universe.,,158 Yasue Norihiro
also suggested that Jewish statelessness was indicative of their lack of virtue. In Yudaya
no hitobito, he distinguished between peoples with states (omote kokka) and those
without states (ura kokka): "the actions of an omote kokka people are all positive, of a
yang quality; those of an ura kokka people are of necessity negative, of a yin quality....
The ura kokka peoples, who are negative, all use treachery to compete. The Jewish
people use treachery to attack people; it is natural for them to do so since they are not an
omote kokka people.,,159
The desire to achieve unity through nationalism, as evident in wartime anti-
Westernism and antisemitism, related to the long-standing fears of cultural and territorial
infiltration by "barbarians." As was true in earlier periods of history, Japanese commonly
associated Western barbarism with a desire to dominate other nations and peoples. In fact,
the Japanese government justified the bombing ofPearl Harbor by blaming it on
America's "selfish desire for world conquest.,,160 Numerous articles, speeches, and
broadcasts echoed this view, including a 1944 Nippon Times article titled simply
"Americans are Barbarians": "We are firmly determined to safeguard the glorious culture
of the Nippon Empire against the American ambition of world domination." 161
The fear of Jewish world domination in politics, economies, and cultures is
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fundamental to most antisemitic tracts, including The Protocols. For some Japanese,
Jews were the real force behind the Western fixation on world domination that had
existed since the first contact with the West. In Yudaya Mondai to Nippon, Inuzuka
Koreshige claimed that Japan had long been a prize sought by Western imperialists,
thanks in large part to "Jewish explorers" such as Marco Polo and Columbus. And a
1944 article in the Yomiuri suggested that Commodore Perry had served as the spearhead
for a Jewish invasion ofJapan. 162
According to Japanese antisemites, the domination of Jews was most evident in
their firm control ofAmerica. In his Citizen sReaderfor Certain Victory, Tokutomi
Iichir5 claimed that the first American immigrants were represented by two groups:
Puritans, who "in their self-righteousness and arrogance achieved their freedom by
suppressing others;" and haughty, contemptuous Anglo-Saxon pirates who settled
primarily in the South. Each group helped fashion the notion ofAmerican supremacy
over minorities, which in turn led to anti-Japanese sentiment. However, controlling both
groups was the "evil and ugly plutocracy" of the Jews. 163
In all forms ofJapanese media, Jews were accused of controlling America. Radio
broadcasts from Tokyo alleged the leaders ofAmerica to be "... a group of plutocrats
and financiers; namely, the Jews and Free Masons. Ifthey lose the war it will mean the
end of their race, so they cannot lose the war...." Another claimed that "Jewish-
dominated Anglo-American powers ... through their capitalistic and imperialistic
162 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 108.
163 Dower, War Without Mercy, 224.
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policies are seeking world hegemony.,,164 The Mainichi shinbun and the Tokyo shinbun
labeled Jews the "Rulers ofAmerica" and claimed that democracy in America and Britain
were equivalent to Jewish plutocracy. 165 Jewish domination was even expressed in
cartoons. In a 1942 caricature ofthe ABeD powers in Manga magazine, America and
Britain were depicted as beastly thugs burning in the rays of the Imperial Sun, and a
crown with a "J," representing the control of Jews, was shown falling from the American
figure's head. 166
Authors also railed against "Jewish plutocratic hegemony." In Tokutomi Soha's
Hissho kokumin dokuhon (Reader for the People Determined to Win), Jews were labeled
"the curse ofmankind.... Under the guise of democracy they wield their plutocratic
hegemony in the United States. American democracy has become a Jewish den.,,167 And
Yasue Norihiro argued in Yudaya no Hitobito that if the Japanese understood the Jews,
they would understand the true nature ofAmerica and Europe. 168
In explaining Jewish control over the American government, Japanese antisemites
made frequent reference to Franklin Roosevelt's Jewishness (although he was not a Jew),
as well as his supposed adherence to Jewish will. He was dubbed a "running dog of
164Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes, 90.
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Jewish imperialists" by the Tokyo shinbun. 169 A radio station in Tokyo branded him a
Jewish pawn in September 1942, claiming he had succumbed to the evil influence of
Jewish bankers, merchants, and money lenders. His "selfish egoism," "Jewish ancestry,"
and submission to "the powerful Jewish clique" were said to explain his hatred for
Germany and his motivations for instigating the war. 170 His Christianity was a facade,
claimed one broadcast: "Roosevelt is nothing but a condottiere of the Hebrews. Rather,
he is a slave of the Hebrew. Through his veins flows pure Hebrew blood.,,171 Some
Japanese citizens also believed that Roosevelt was dominated by Jews. After hearing a
speech by Shi5den Nobutaka, postwar historian Irokawa Daikichi, a graduate student at
Tokyo Imperial University during the war, recorded in his diary: "Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek,
Roosevelt, and Churchill are all international clowns of the Jews.,,172
Roosevelt's relation to Jews was also parodied in cartoons. In "Grieving Statue of
Liberty," a sketch by Ono Saseo, a demonic caricature ofRoosevelt sits atop the Statue of
Liberty, waving the slogan of"democracy" while brandishing the club of "dictatorship."
On Liberty's crown sit a number of different figures, including an "antiwar" sailor, a
worker waving a strike placard, and a clownish Jew wearing a dunce cap inscribed with
the Star ofDavid, inflating a balloon of profits disguised as the American flag. 173
169 Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 162.
170 Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes, 90.
171 Ibid., 91.
172 Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 161.
173 Dower, War WithoutMercy, 194.
83
Japanese propagandists not only targeted Roosevelt for attacks, but also Churchill,
Uncle Sam, and John Bull. In Japanese representations, these figures were often
portrayed as elderly and decrepit, which John Dower argues is representative of a
Japanese focus on the dwindling powers ofAnglo-America, "a declining force in the face
of the new Japan and the emerging new global order.,,174 While Japanese often focused
on highlighting their important "traditions" and ancient roots as a way of establishing
their uniqueness, they worked with equal vigor to evoke the image of a "new" Japan.
Achieving a fresh start, a new level of racial and spiritual purity free from Western racist
imperialism, was a view widely shared among Japanese. Newness was often expressed
through youthfulness, as was evident by the appearance of the folk icon Momotar5 (The
Peach Boy)-a young, conquering hero who subdued demons in a distant land-over and
over in Japanese propaganda. Momotar5 represented both Japan's ancient roots and its
h . 175quest to us er In a new era.
From the perspective of Japanese antisemities, Jews were perfect representatives
ofthe old, oppressive order. The centuries-old Jewish domination ofworld affairs was an
idea frequently voiced among antisemities worldwide. Writer Kumamoto Arihisa argued
in his Collected Lectures on Morals that the Pacific war was a rivalry between new and
old world views. Kumamoto wrote that the new world view "awakens independent
people to self-consciousness, coexistence and coprosperity, each helping the other to be
secure in his place." The old world view, however, was based on "Jewish economic
174 Dower, War Without Mercy, 259.
175 Ibid., 252, 256.
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monopolism, freedom and capitalism, seeking to subjugate the world through the
influence of money on politics.,,176 Atago Hokuzan, a professor at Tohoku Imperial
University, contended that democracies (the old way) were weak and subject to Jewish
influence, while fascist nations (the new way) rooted out the Jewish threat with
nationalistic fervor. Author Takeda Seigo also made frequent references to the old Jewish
way, suggesting that "The old order ofthe Anglo-American Jews was extremely
inhumane and immoral," a place where Jews enjoyed the pleasures of life at the expense
of other nations. The present war, Takeda argued, "is a moral war to crush evil and
spread the truth.,,177
The Jewish domination of international media was also commonly reiterated by
Japanese antisemites, most often in relation to the spread of anti-Japanese sentiment.
When Japan faced increasing international scorn in the 1930s, "Jews" were blamed for
promoting an anti-Japanese attitude in Great Britain, America, and the League of
Nations. 178 In a 1939 letter to Inuzuka Koreshige, industrialist Tamura Mitsuz5 pondered
the anti-Japanese air of the American media: "American arrogance is one factor, but also
the six million Jews who have a dominant foothold in the financial, industrial, and
political worlds. They have no scruples.,,179 In Shinajihen to Yudayajin (The China
Incident and the Jews), Koshi Akarike argued that worldwide news was controlled by
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Jews in London and New York, who printed inflammatory articles that led the world to
"misunderstand the true nature of the China incident.,,18o And in his 1944 book Shinbun
to Yudayajin (Newspapers and the Jews), Takeda Seigo argued that Jews used newspapers
as one of its main weapons for achieving world domination: "While we Japanese
unconsciously read their newspapers and listen to their news, our very way oflife is
becoming Anglo-American Judaized.,,181 Thus, the supposed Jewish control of the media
resonated with historical fears of domination and Japanese resentment ofWestern racism,
while also downplaying Japanese culpability by transposing blame onto a mythical
"Other."
In contrast to the barbarism ofWesterners, Japanese stressed their moral
superiority and humanity. While some anti-Western propagandists identified with "real"
Jews as common victims united against Western oppression, antisemites used the threat
of the international Jewish enemy to bolster Japan's position as the savior ofAsia and
mankind. In these cases, Jewish power as described in The Protocols merged with
Japan's divine mission to liberate the world of Jewish domination. It also related to the
broader goals of liberating East Asia from Western imperialism and reestablishing a new
order under Japanese guidance. In January 1940, Ita Ken claimed that Japan's real
purpose in the war was to rid Asia of Jewish influence, as "small steps Japan takes are
giant strides for Asia." 182 Similarly, Yasue Norihiro argued that it was Japan's divine
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mission to not only liberate the Russians and Chinese from the stranglehold of the Jews,
but also "rehabilitate" the Jews themselves so they might assume a role in the Co-
Prosperity Sphere. 183
Some antisemites went a step further, reiterating the centrality of Japan in world
affairs by suggesting that it alone determined the fate of humanity. Professor Atago
Hokuzan suggested that sense of international isolation: "Only Holy Japan remains to
strike down the Jews and save Mankind." 184 Shiratori Toshio also claimed that, should
Japan be defeated, the world would fall into the hands of the Jews and the future of
humanity would be bleak. 185 In describing Anglo-American Jewry as the enemy of
humanity, Takeda Seigo argued that the full strength of Japan should be mustered not
only to liberate Asia, but also to "deliver world humanity from the misfortune ofAnglo-
America." 186
Contextualizing Japanese antisemitism within discussions of Japanese relations
with "Others, as well as within the context ofwartime anti-Westernism, reveals that the
Jewish enemy was far less foreign than one might assume. Similarly, the seemingly
contradictory distinctions made between "real" Jews and the metaphorical "Jewish enemy"
by the Japanese during the prewar and wartime periods becomes less incongruous when
one broadens the scope of their investigation. In fact, Japanese condemnations of "the
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West" in earlier periods of history were not necessarily intended to incite hostility toward
"real" Westerners residing in Japan.
In the nationalistic atmosphere of late Meiji, the perceived threat of foreign peril
led minkan ideologues to precipitate a number of patriotic controversies. Christianity,
which many Japanese had accepted as both a personal faith and the religion of
"civilization," came under attack for its supposed threat to the spiritual unity of Japan, as
well as its association with various Western ideals, such as republicanism, individualism,
socialism, and colonialism. 187 But Western Christians were not the only ones targeted for
attacks. Any Japanese who espoused Western ideals, such as Christianity, could become
a "metaphorical" foreigner "in whose alien reflection the silhouette of patriotism emerged
that much more clearly." 188 However, Japanese Christians were allowed to continue
practicing their faith as long as they were willing to also swear loyalty as Japanese. Thus,
"the foreign" was used to define "Japaneseness," but once defined, the native was used to
nationalize the foreign. As Carol Gluck notes, the real significance of attacking
Christianity was not to affect religious practices, but to strengthen "the civil morality to
which all loyal and patriotic Japanese of any faith had now necessarily to subscribe.,,189
In other instances, "real" Westerners were clearly distinguished from the "Western
enemy." In 1899, new Japanese laws allowing foreigners to reside anywhere in the
country and freely engage in commerce prompted concerns about the Western threat to
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Japanese morals and customs. Minkan ideologues urged fellow Japanese to resist the
immorality ofWesterners manifested in materialism, greed, and lust, and to remain loyal,
patriotic, Japanese citizens. Despite the scathing remarks and warnings made in 1899,
the situation for Westerners residing in Japan did not change in the least. But "real"
Westerners had never been the point, as Carol Gluck notes: "what had mattered was the
idea of the West that the Japanese had created for purposes of self-definition. The real
West was irrelevant; in the imagined West people were incapable ofloyalty, and this was
sufficient to define these traits as essentially Japanese.,,190 Foreigners served as
ideological means to the patriotic ends ofdefensive nationalism. The same had been true
in the Tokugawa Period, as the slogan "revere the emperor, expel the barbarian," proved
little more than a catchphrase devoid of meaningful content that was used to unite and
mobilize the energies of dissident samurai. 191 Both the imagined Western enemy ofthe
Meiji Period and the imagined Jewish enemy ofWorld War II were used in the cause of
defensive nationalism. Once those aims were achieved (or defeated) and defensive
nationalism waned, the fervent outcries of the ideologues also subsided. 192
While Japanese distinguished between "real" and imagined "Others" well before
World War II, they also had a long history of harnessing the laudable qualities of"Others,"
even those viewed as the antithesis of"Japaneseness," for their own benefit. In Japanese
folklore, marebito (visiting gods) were said to possess dual qualities ofgood and evil that
190 Gluck, Japan sModem Myths, 137.
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could be either creative or destructive. According to legend, when a marebito visited a
village at an unexpected time, it brought evil and hardship. However, if proper rituals
were followed, marebito could be brought into society under controlled conditions and
kept at a distance, thus serving a useful purpose. 193
In the Tokugawa Period, the primary use of the "Other" was to highlight Japan's
superiority and preserve the legitimacy of its rulers. Even when a series of domestic
crises in the 1830s seriously weakened the shogunate, and the onset of the First Opium
War aroused fears ofWestern domination that the Tokugawa rulers seemed ill-equipped
to repel, the Tokugawa turned to lesser "Others" to maintain the semblance of Japanese
diplomatic centrality. Ryiikyii and Korea had long been viewed as vassal states expected
to offer tributes to the Japanese emperor. By the 1830s and 1840s, the economic benefits
of those tributes were minimal, but the shogunate managed to increase the number of
Korean and Ryiikyiian embassies to Edo in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to
"refurbish the mirror ofTokugawa glory.,,194
As Japan underwent dramatic political and social changes in the final years of the
Tokugawa Period, calls for returns to "what was irreducibly Japanese," became
increasingly frequent among Japanese ideologues. 195 For many, Japan was already
engaged in a war with the West, a battle to defend the distinctive Japanese spirit against
the corrupting influences of modern civilization. Despite his skepticism, Aizawa
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Seishisai eventually conceded that the West was an overwhelmingly powerful force, and
he argued that Japan could only regain its former supremacy by adopting Western
learning and turning that knowledge against the West in a future confrontation. 196 As
Japan entered the Meiji Period and began its rush to modernize, many other Japanese
accepted Westernization as necessary in order to "know your enemy."
Utilizing the "power" of"Others" continued into the prewar and wartime periods.
The Fugu Plan represents an obvious example, although Jews were not the only group the
Japanese sought to exploit for personal benefit. In Manchukuo, Japanese established a
Cossack village around 1935 in order to use White Russians as intelligence operatives
against the Soviets. 197 And in the 1930s, the Japanese worked to incite Mrican American
equal-rights riots in America. They encouraged a splinter group ofBlack Muslims to
support the Japanese emperor, cultivated a relationship with the influential black leader,
Robert O. Jordan, and set up a press service, the "Negro News Syndicate" (which was
ultimately ineffective). 198 Thus, one might argue that the Japanese government's
flirtation with the Fugu Plan was part of a long desire to exploit lesser "Others" for the
benefit of the "superior" Japanese.
In many ways, discussions of the Jewish enemy paralleled those of the Western
enemy that had developed since the arrival of the first Christian missionaries. Like
Westerners, Jews were said to be dominators of nation-states and cultures, and their
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treachery, materialism, and cowardice afforded them status as barbarians in the minds of
some Japanese. Using Jews, Japanese applauded the superiority of their national unity
and humanity, emphasized their divine mission to free the world, and defined themselves
through the un-Japanese characteristics of the enemy "Other." For some, the age-old
Jewish conspiracy theory proved useful in explaining the historical motivations of the
West in relation to Japan, and the Jewish enemy became a convenient and defenseless
scapegoat for wartime behavior and anti-Japanese sentiment. Japan could never divorce
itself completely from the West, even in the wartime atmosphere, as many of its modem
achievements were byproducts ofWestern influence. Yet invoking the Jewish enemy
offered a way to bypass that history. Japanese afforded Jews a "double otherness" as both
Westerners and Jews, associating them with the worst aspects of the West (as members or
controllers of the Western world), but also with distinctly negative Jewish traits
"legitimized" by works such as The Protocols and grounded in centuries ofWestern
antisemitism.
The juxtaposition of Japanese antisemites' discussions of the "Jewish enemy" to
historical relations with the Western "Other" is not intended to minimize their culpability.
With some exceptions, Japanese antisemites subscribed to their own rhetoric, adhering to
an ideology that resulted in the slaughter of millions of people from a variety of nations
and cultures whose only common link was their Jewish ancestry. In fact, it is by
discussing antisemitism through a narrow historical lens that Japanese culpability is truly
minimized. Whether viewing it as a product of German influence or as a bizarre
aberration, simplistic dismissals of Japanese antisemitism echo postwar tendencies to
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whitewash Japan's historical record. By providing a historical context through which to
examine its development and persistence, however, antisemitism assumes a place in the
long-standing Japanese essentialization of the Western "Other." While "the Jewish
enemy" at times existed apart from the West, its similarities with "the Western enemy"
suggest that Japanese antisemitism persisted in large part because of its correlation to a
well-established image ofJapan's ultimate enemy. Interestingly, the loss of the war and
rapprochement with America coincided with a widespread dismissal of antisemitism and
even a turn toward philosemitism. Thus, the long and complex history of Japanese
relations with the Western "Other" is intrinsically connected to the persistence of
antisemitism in Japan. By associating Japanese antisemitism with broader historical
trends, the all too common labels of"peculiarity" and "incomprehensibility" can be
disregarded, and antisemitism can assume its proper place within modern Japanese
history.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Today, as in the past, "Japan" is seldom mentioned in the same sentence as
"Jews." Nevertheless, memories of Japanese-Jewish relations during the Holocaust have
been preserved by Jews, Japanese, and scholars around the world. Historical realties are
often colored by debates concerning whether "Japan" was savior, persecutor, or bystander.
In recent years, Japan's wartime atrocities have garnered considerable international
attention, prompting nations such as China and Korea to demand Japanese apologies.
However, the Japanese government has generally resisted these pressures, preferring to
highlight the merits of Japan's wartime mission and the sacrifices of its people while
downplaying or completely dismissing atrocities. Although often overshadowed by other
controversies, Japanese relations with Jews in the prewar and wartime periods have also
become a part ofthe selective wartime memory, as evident in frequent invocations of
"Sugihara" and "Shanghai."
Sugihara, sometimes referred to as the "Japanese Schindler," became the first
Japanese to be declared a "Righteous Gentile" by Yad Vashem. 199 His acts of altruism
have been recalled in numerous books, articles, television programs, and documentaries
in Japan and around the world. Amidst the seemingly endless accounts of Japanese
199 Levine, In Search ofSugihara , 6.
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brutality and war crimes, Sugihara's story presents an obvious and much-desired example
of Japanese kindness and humanity. Likewise, the story of the Shanghai Jews is a
positive one in contrast to most Jewish accounts of the Holocaust. Numerous oral history
accounts attest to the gratefulness of the Jewish survivors, and the facts suggest that life
in the Shanghai "ghetto" was far less difficult than in any of its European counterparts.
Ernest Heppner, a resident of the Shanghai ghetto, recalled the ghetto as a place of trial
and tribulation, but also as a place where Jews from a variety of nations achieved a sense
of solidarity and tested their capacity to create a single Jewish nation. More simply,
however, Heppner appreciated that thousands of Jewish lives were saved: "Shanghai
provided us with a haven from the Holocaust.,,2oo In a similar way, historian David
Kranzler refers to the ghetto as the "the miracle of Shanghai," leading him to conclude
that Japanese policies were ultimately "pro_Jewish.,,201
The image ofJapan as a pro-jewish nation during the Holocaust is also
perpetuated among the Japanese themselves. Since the immediate postwar era, a
selective wartime memory began to be fashioned, with the support of the American
occupiers, which situated blame for Japan's destruction on a select group of militaristic,
ultranationalist leaders. As the rest ofthe nation distanced itself from the wartime regime,
unpleasant memories were removed from the historical narrative, resulting in a
superficial version ofevents that has sparked numerous international controversies (i.e.
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omissions of crucial details about the Nanking Massacre and "Comfort" Women in high
school textbooks). In attempting to bury their militaristic past, Japanese adopted new
notions of peace and democracy while rejecting the right wing ideas associated with the
wartime leaders. Antisemitism, too, became unfashionable and was widely criticized by
Japanese intellectuals. However, a number Japanese went much further than simply
rejecting antisemitism. Many became philosemitic and attempted to befriend Jews:
several Japanese-Jewish organizations, including the Japan-Israel Foundation and Japan
Association for Jewish Studies, were founded to promote friendship, mutual
understanding, and Zionism. 202 Well-respected intellectuals began to perpetuate the idea
that this postwar cordiality was not a rapprochement, but an enduring characteristic of
Japanese-Jewish relations. It became common to compare Japanese and Jews, or to
search for similarities between the two "races," regardless of the validity of such research.
Intellectuals espoused common ancestry theories, suggesting linguistic relationships
between Japanese and Aramaic-for example, the Japanese word anata and the Aramaic
word anta both mean "you"-and even hypothesized that the Japanese were direct
descendants of one of the Lost Tribes ofIsrae1. 203 In 1970, Yamamoto Shichihei, using
the pen name Isaiah Ben-Dasan (who Yamamoto falsely claimed was a Jew born and
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raised in Japan), authored Nihon to Yudayajin (Japan and the Jews), the number one
bestseller of any genre that year. In his book, which is believed by some to be the first of
the nihonjinron (studies of Japaneseness) works, Yamamoto "became" Jewish to lend
credibility to his theories of Japanese uniqueness, "pushing the postwar tendency to
identify with the Jews to its logical extreme."Z04 A former soldier stationed in the
Philippines, Yamamoto's work reveals his sense of frustrated Japanese nationalism, as he
claims that "Nihonism" (Japanism) is as much a religion as Judaism or Christianity. The
values of the Japanese are different from those of the Jews (or West), he argues, and those
differences have propelled the Japanese people to their present condition (of economic
success). Yamamoto's descriptions of Judaism are often inaccurate and are sometimes
confused with Christianity, and he makes use of a number of stereotypes, labeling Jews
"nomads" and "skillful, cautious handlers of money."Z05 Yet his point was not to provide
a factually accurate portrayal of Jews, but rather to use them as a foreign mirror to
provide a reassuring image ofJapanese uniqueness and superiority.
More common than using Jews to highlight Japanese uniqueness, however, has
been the postwar Japanese tendency to seek commonalities among "shared" experiences
ofJapanese and Jewish victimization. This idea, promoted by Japanese, Jews, and others,
typically juxtaposes the inhumane destruction of life caused by the dropping ofthe
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205 Isaiah Ben-Dasan, The Japanese and the Jews, trans. Richard L. Gage (New York: Weatherhill, 1972),
102,133.
97
atomic bombs ("Hiroshima") with that of the Holocaust ("Auschwitz,,).206 Hiroshima
and Auschwitz became the ultimate symbols of Japanese and Jewish suffering, and they
were often discussed in isolation of other wartime events. That uniqueness was
expressed by Ota Yoko, a Hiroshima survivor, in her novel City ofCorpses: "We had
been flattened by a force-arbitrary and violent-that wasn't war.,,207 Hiroshima and
Auschwitz thus became linked in the minds of many Japanese, which not only
contributed to the skewing ofwartime memory by obfuscating the "elementary
distinction between victim and aggressor," but also increased Japanese interest in Jewish
victimization.208
Today, the Japanese-Jewish connection through victimization is a commonly
invoked theme in Japanese representations ofWorld War II. A number of Japanese
museums, including the Osaka International Peace Center and Kyoto Museum for World
Peace, feature Auschwitz exhibits immersed in what are otherwise Pacific War-oriented
collections. At the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall, special ceramic masks were sculpted
using soil from both the epicenter of the atomic blast and from Auschwitz, creating a
physical and psychological association between the victims of the bombings and the
concentration camps?09 Although Japan's Jewish population remains minuscule, a
206 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 173.
207 Ian Buruma, The Wages ofGuilt: Memories ofWar in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar Straus
Giroux, 1994), 92, 93, 101.
208 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 178.
209 Roger B. Jeans, "Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary
Japan," The Journal ofMilitary History 69, no. 1 (2005): 175, 181; Silverman, "Jewish Emigres and
Popular Images of Jews in Japan," 230.
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museum devoted exclusively to the Holocaust, the Holocaust Education Center, opened
in Hiroshima prefecture in 1995, reportedly receiving 10,000 visitors in its first year.210
Aside from the Holocaust Education Center, at least two other Holocaust museums, the
Auschwitz Peace Museum and Tokyo Holocaust Education Resource Center, have
opened since 2000. For Otsuka Makota, Director General ofthe Holocaust Education
Center, the primary function of the museums is to raise public awareness of the Holocaust.
In an article stressing the need for Holocaust education in Japan, Otsuka applauded the
recent media attention given to Schindler and Sugihara but stressed the need to develop a
deeper understanding of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, his well-intentioned statements
also included typical expressions of Japanese wartime victimization: "As the only
country which was attacked with atomic bombs, peace education has been vigorously
promoted in Japan. We have not, however, given much attention to teaching children to
think about why the Holocaust took place and what can be done to prevent such an event
from recurring, while, at the same time, not neglecting the tragic aspect ofthe war which
brought so much suffering to Japan.,,211
The victimization link also helps explain the popularity ofAnne Frank in postwar
Japan. For the Japanese, and for many others throughout the world, Frank epitomized
"the Holocaust victim," and her diary, first published in Japanese in 1952, sold more
copies in Japan than in any other nation except the U.S. However, from the Japanese
210 See the Holocaust Education Center website: http://www.urban.ne.jp/home/hecjpn/index.html.
211 Makoto Otsuka, "Importance ofHolocaust Education in Japan," Journal ofGenocide Research 1, no. 3
(1999): 460.
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perspective, details concerning Judaism or the Holocaust remain less significant than
Frank's personal struggle to overcome adversity. Junior high school textbooks in the
1970s and 1980s included Frank's story in kokugo (Japanese language) rather than in
history or social studies. Her story was intended as a lesson in self-examination through
the diary form, and her life was described as "a spiritual struggle to hold on to human
values amid the duress ofwar.,,212
Perhaps in a similar way, the tale of Sugihara might be more often viewed as a
story of individual struggle during the war than as a lesson on the Holocaust. Although
an employee ofthe Japanese government, is often depicted as an individual resisting the
wartime regime in the only way he could at the time, by refusing to comply with
immigration regulations. Some even insist that Sugihara was dismissed for his actions
(although the evidence is debatable), thereby becoming a victim himself. In this way,
Sugihara becomes representative of the typical Japanese victim: an inherently moral
person who struggled to do the right thing, or in some cases simply survive, against a
group ofpowerful and oppressive government leaders. When Sugihara was honored at
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 2000, Japanese Ambassador Yanai
Shunji expressed that sentiment in his speech: "When Japanese today look back on those
days ofdeep regret and hardship, there is one life in particular that breaks through for us
and that is the life ofChiune Sugihara.,,213
212 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 168; Silverman, "Jewish Emigres and Popular
Images of Jews in Japan," 238.
213 "U.S. Museum Opens Exhibition for Japanese Who Saved Jews," May 8, 2000.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles mi_mOXPQ/is_2000_May_8/at62170663
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Some take Yanai's notion further, suggesting that "Sugihara's actions" are
synonymous with "Japan's actions." That idea is presented in a book by Sugihara
Seishir5 (no relation to Chiune), a revisionist historian who, in reexamining the
culpability of the Japanese Foreign Ministry during the war, suggests that leaking the
story of Sugihara could have changed the outcome of the Tokyo Trials: "... even the
pariah nation Japan had produced someone who saved the lives of six thousands Jews....
It is unfortunate for Japan that Sugihara's achievements were not appropriately
recognized at that time."Z14 The author does not elaborate on the ways in which the trials
might have been changed, but his statements suggest that Sugihara's story would not have
been told as a tale of individual goodness, but as a representation of praiseworthy
"Japanese" values which would ultimately have improved the images of those on trial.
Perhaps like Hiroshima and Anne Frank, the tale of Sugihara has come to exist in a realm
somewhere between historical reality and selective memory.
Further evidence of Japan's reluctance to confront its antisemitic past lies in the
controversial Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho (New History Textbook). The text, first
published in 2001 with the endorsement of the Japanese Ministry ofEducation, has
sparked numerous protests throughout Asia for its omission or glossing over of Japanese
military aggression in the twentieth century. While most of the controversy centers on
the Nanking Massacre and "Comfort Women," the text also includes a brief yet revealing
section on the Holocaust. Its examination of the Holocaust in Europe is facile, simply
214 Seishiro Sugihara, Between Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the Diplomacy ofJapan:SO Foreign
Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam, trans. Noonan Hu (Lanham, MD: University ofAmerica Press,
1997), 158-159.
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noting that Jews were subjected to intense persecution and that millions died in
concentration camps and at the hands of the Germans. However, the Japanese relation to
the Holocaust is mentioned several pages later in a special section, "Portraits of Japanese
History," under the title "Japanese Who Saved Jewish Lives: Higuchi Kiichiro and
Sugihara Chiune." While Sugihara's tale is accurate, Higuchi is said to have treated the
case of Jewish refugees as "a humanitarian one based on the principle of 'harmony among
five races' upon which the State ofManchuria was founded.,,215 The article makes no
mention ofHiguchi's role in supporting the exploitation of Jews through the Fugu Plan.
Nor is there any discussion ofJapanese antisemitism. While the Atarashii Rekishi
Kyokasho is not widely used in the Japanese education system, it serves as an obvious
example of historical amnesia sanctioned by the state.
Japanese memories of the Holocaust and Japanese-Jewish relations during the
1930s and 1940s have become selective and overly simplified in the postwar discourses
of victimization and Japanese wartime culpability. While one cannot ignore the historical
facts-that Sugihara saved Jews, that Shanghai was a haven in comparison to the ghettos
ofEurope, or that the Japanese allowed Jewish immigration at a time when many Western
nations did not-postwar philosemitism and notions of shared victimization have masked
reality. In fact, antisemitism existed at all levels of Japanese society during the 1930s and
1940s. Even today, an undercurrent of antisemitism is present in Japan, at times drawing
international attention. A 1995 article in Marco Polo magazine sparked controversy by
blatantly denying the existence of the Holocaust:
215 Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho [New History Textbook] (Tokyo: Fusosha, 2006), 193,202-203.
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The "Holocaust" is a fabrication. There were no execution gas chambers in
Auschwitz or in any other concentration camp. Today, what are displayed as "gas
chambers" at the remains of the Auschwitz camp in Poland are a post-war
fabrication by the Polish communist regime or by the Soviet Union, which
controlled the country. Not once, neither at Auschwitz nor in any territory
controlled by the Germans during the Second World War, was there "mass murder
of Jews" in "gas chambers.,,216
Just two weeks after the appearance of this article, Marco Polo was permanently
shut down. The affair made front page news in the Japanese press, although for the most
part, journalists focused on the quality of the magazine's journalism and the implications
of the article for Japan, rather than engaging in discussions about Japanese
. • • 217
antIsemItIsm.
A little more than a month after the Marco Polo controversy, the notorious Aum
Shinrikyo cult carried out poison gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system, killing twelve
people. The group's manifesto, "The Manual ofFear," quoted at length from The
Protocols, blaming Jews for "promoting mindless popular culture and fomenting endless
wars of attrition in order to weaken the gentile nations of the world and turn non-Jews
into docile cattle.,,218 However, it was not Western Jews on whichAum focused its
attacks, but rather Japanese who supposedly espoused Jewish ideals. As was true with
216 A translation of the article appears on the website of the Institute for Historical Review, one of the
world's leading Holocaust denial organizations: http://www.ihr.orgiother/marco....Polo.html.
217 David Goodman, "Anti-Semitism in Japan: Its History and Cultural Implications." in Frank Dikotter, ed.,
The Construction o/Racial Identities in China andJapan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives
(Honolulu: University ofHawaii Press, 1997), 194-195.
218 Ibid., 195-196.
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anti-Christian and anti-Western Meiji ideologues', as well as with antisemites during the
1930s and 1940s, Aum did not confront "real" Jews, but rather used antisemitism to
define "the foreign" as a way to express their definition of"Japaneseness."
Beyond the antisemitic fringe of Japanese society, Jews continue to arouse
considerable public attention. That is clearly evident in the success of author Uno
Masami, whose works first appeared in the mid-1980s. Uno achieved fame in Japan and
abroad for his antisemitic tracts, which denied the Holocaust, described the United States
as a Jewish nation, and referenced the international Jewish conspiracy theory of The
Protocols. Uno was quoted approvingly by the Japanese media and was even invited to
speak at a Constitution Day rally sponsored by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
Although he authored a number of works, his most popular were Yudaya ga wakaru to
sekai ga miete kuru (IfYou Understand the Jews, You Will Understand the World) and
Yudaya ga wakaru to Nihon ga miete kuru (IfYou Understand the Jews, You Will
Understand Japan).219 In the latter, Uno claimed that in seeking to destroy Japan, Jews
diminished the nation's financial resources by luring Japanese companies overseas and
engaging in devious stock market speculation.220 At a time of national uncertainty caused
by economic recession, Uno revived familiar images of Jews that both highlighted and
blamed "the foreign" without specifically attacking the West. Today, his books continue
to sell, and a number of antisemitic authors, most notably Dta Ryii, build upon the
219 Goodman, "Anti-Semitism in Japan," 188-189; Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind,
228-229.
220 Uno Masami, Yudaya ga wakaru to Nihon ga miete kuru [IfYou Understand the Jews, You Will
Understand Japan] (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1986), 6.
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foundation he laid. While many contemporary bookstores include section of books
related to the Jewish conspiracy, they are often described as tondemo bon (outrageous
books), perhaps indicating that many Japanese do not take them seriously.
Indeed, it is as difficult to universally categorize Japanese opinions of Jews today
as it was in the prewar and wartime periods. Yet this thesis has suggested that such
labeling is impossible, as opinions are far from uniform. As was true in the prewar and
wartime periods, the Jews have never assumed a single position in the Japanese mind, nor
have they served a single purpose. Yet parallels do exist between the past and present.
With members ofAum Shinrikyo and Uno Masami, as with Japanese antisemites of the
past, Jews were used to define Japanese identity or offered as convenient scapegoats for
periods of national uncertainty or crisis. And contemporary Japanese interest in the
Holocaust, as reflected in the creation ofHolocaust museums, is motivated by both
feelings of common victimization as well as by genuine concern, tendencies clearly
evident in the prewar and wartime periods.
Similarly, it is as difficult to pinpoint a single explanation for the persistence of
antisemitism in contemporary Japan as it is for the prewar and wartime periods. However,
the "Jewish enemy's" similarity with the historical "Western enemy," when combined
with foreign influence and Japanese desires to unify under a monolithic identity,
elucidates the persistence of antisemitism in Japan. Still, despite its usefulness in
wartime propaganda, antisemitism did not culminate in the persecution ofJews. As was
true at other times in Japanese history, a line was drawn between real and imagined
"Others." While the imagined represented the antithesis of"Japaneseness," the real was
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not bound to that identity. Accordingly, the simultaneous saving of Jewish lives and
promotion of antisemitism is less contradictory than one might assume. After all, both
interpretations of Jews contributed in different ways to the goals ofexpanding the
Japanese empire, achieving national unity during the war, and defeating the Western
enemy. However, that realization can only be achieved by properly contextualizing
Japanese antisemitism, both in the wide array ofJapanese imaginings of Jews, as well as
in the broader history of Japanese relations with "Others." In doing so, Japanese
antisemitism is understood not simply as a bizarre departure from Japanese history, but as
an ideological development shaped by historical experiences with the West and the
nationalism, imperialism, and militarism that characterized prewar and wartime Japan.
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